



The Dynamics and Constraints of Regional House of Representative Councils in Implementing their Supervisory Functions

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ABSTRACT

The journey of the Regional House of Representative Councils (Indonesian: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, abbreviated DPRD, from now on referred to as council) has gone through some dynamics in carrying out its duties and functions, along with the development of society, the government system, and the political system in Indonesia. As part of the Regional Government, DPRD has three functions: legislative function, budgetary function, and supervisory function. Supervision is the function that is most likely to be carried out optimally because the council has full authority and does not depend on other parties, such as the executive or regional head. During its implementation, the council's supervisory function experienced ups and downs. In early Indonesia's reformation era, the council's supervisory function was used as a means of pressure on regional heads. This could happen because, at that time, the regional head had to be responsible to the council. Based on this condition, the council's position greatly determined the regional head's sustainability. Meanwhile, as for now, the council's supervisory function is only limited to the implementation of regional legal products, which include regional regulations and regulations issued by the regional head, as well as other regulations related to the implementation of regional government. Additionally, it encompasses monitoring follow-up actions resulting from financial audit reports by the Audit Board, the consequences of which do not impact the continuity of the regional head's position. The focus of this study is limited to the dynamics of the council in carrying out its supervisory function and the obstacles it faces. This study results from normative legal research using the statute and conceptual approaches. The expected contribution of this study is, theoretically, for the advancement of legal science, particularly in the areas of constitutional law and administrative law. Also, it aims to provide insights into the components of regional governance, specifically for regional heads or regional government and particularly for DPRD. In addition, it is also expected to contribute to the provision of legal source materials, especially those related to the council's function for other researchers.

Keywords: Regional People's Representative Assembly (DPRD), Dynamics and constraints, Regional House of Representative Councils, Supervisory function.

1. INTRODUCTION

The implementation of regional autonomy is greatly influenced by the development of the strategic environment, both nationally and internationally (Parluhutan et al., 2022). The momentum of reformation in Indonesia is considered the right time to implement regional autonomy. That moment could also be an opportunity to decide what kind of regional government administration system Indonesia will use, as well as a way to develop local resource potential with that system (Orlova, 2020). Therefore, as a form of responsiveness to the community's wishes to implement regional autonomy, the People's Consultative Assembly issued the Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly (Indonesian: Keputusan Majelis Permusyawaratan) No. XV/MPR/1998, among other things, mandates the need to realize the implementation of regional autonomy and the utilization of equitable national resources and financial balance between the Central and Regional governments.

Based on the Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly, as said before, at the beginning of the reformation, the Government, together with the council, established a package of regional autonomy legislation, namely Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 22 of 1999, concerning Regional Government and Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 25 of 1999 concerning Financial Balance between the Central and Regional

Governments, which are currently both Laws replaced by Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government and Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 1 of 2022 concerning Financial Relations Between the Central Government and Regional Governments.

The council's performance in carrying out its duties and functions, including the supervisory function, must be connected to the involvement of other governance parties at the national and regional levels (Syafina et al., 2022). About this, the council's performance could be viewed based on these 2 (two) basic approaches, namely: political economy (Manor, 1999) and considerations of administration and public management (Turner & Hulme, 1997). The political economy approach will place the council as part of the region development parties because one of the main reasons for decentralization policy implementation is the optimization of region development (Rani & Saini, 2023).

Thus, according to this view, all functions and duties of the council fall into these 3 (three) categories of decentralization: administrative decentralization or deconcentration, fiscal decentralization, and democratic decentralization or devolution. This perspective shows that the implementation of decentralization involving the council as one of the actors in regional governance must carry out every task in stages, starting from the lower ones, such as administrative decentralization, which requires the council to carry out all of its duties and functions to supervise regional policies so that they do not conflict with national policies, to the higher one such as democratic decentralization.

Meanwhile, the second approach places the council within the framework of a formal political structure, which means that the empowerment of the council is placed in the context of political decentralization because the institution is no longer part of the regional government as was the case when Law Number 5 of 1974 came into effect. Thus, according to this second approach, the council is placed in democratic decentralization, which provides full authority for the implementation of regional government (Andria et al., 2020).

In relation to the council's capacity to carry out its duties and functions, the United Nations Development Program has conducted a study on governance in Indonesia, and the results state that the implementation of decentralization and regional autonomy policies in Indonesia involves several risks that evolve around a changes in council function and the increased of council capacity that needs to be anticipated.

There are at least 2 (two) things that need to be focused on, namely: first, in the National Human Development Report Indonesia stated that "decentralization may pose a threat to Indonesia's record of macroeconomic prudence. This happens as a direct consequence of a rise in government paraphernalia and institutions, such as regional and district parliaments" (UNDP, 2000). This means that the existence of the council is seen as a threat to economic development if the presence of the council as one of the components of the implementation of government affairs in the regions actually worsens the performance of regional government. This is as warned by Mc. Carthy (Carthy, 1983) states that public officers must avoid conflicts of duty and interest between tasks that include public goods and personal financial interests to avoid abusing the authority inherent in their position (Bouamra & Hafdallah, 2022).

The second one is related to the financial capability of the region, especially regarding the privatization policy, which one of the objectives is to reduce the government's fiscal load. However, it should be noted that increasing efficiency should not cause political intervention from the council in private management (Viravan, 1992). Privatization should be able to overcome social and political problems in society and not create new problems due to political pressure by giving access or control to the business sector based on their position in the council or local government.

As we know, the council's functions, as stipulated in the laws and regulations, include legislative, budgetary, and supervisory functions. All of these are the embodiments of the representative function. However, in actual conditions, this representative function emphasizes more into political party representatives (Ewendia et al., 2020), leading them as council members rather than as public representatives who should be able to aggregate all the interests of the masses in council products or through face-to-face forums with the government. This marks the differences in mindset between the council members and the general public or even their constituents regarding the council's function (Hauter, 2004).

Through face-to-face forums with the government, the council can present the institution as a representative of the public who accommodates and channels the aspirations of tons of people they represent (Usmulyadi et al., 2023), but the weakness lies in the policy line strength and the will of the political party or faction from which the council members come, compared to the council members voicing the constituents they represent if the two interests are at odds (Ceron, 2014). This is what distinguishes Indonesia from the conditions in the United States, which set their

people truly as kings before council members (Schütze, 2017) who represent the interests of the people in their districts so that almost every Friday, members of the United States council return to their districts and meet with constituents and various communities, then only on Monday, they return to their workplaces, so that relations between council members are maintained with their constituents (Taburejo, 2007).

With the implementation of direct general elections that can elect candidates for council members, the behavior of the council and the political paradigm in response to community aspirations need to be changed by considering the interests and preferences of its constituents and placing the people as a parties who help oversee the implementation of regional government effectively (Hyronimus & Arif, 2023). The problem often occurs because the council (and other regional government institutions) tend to impose or prioritize their own political thinking. Although on various occasions, they state that they understand the aspirations of the community, in practice, sometimes it conflicts with the public's logic. In fact, the community often does not agree with how politicians think, so it's not uncommon for the council to provide inadequate space for public participation (Hauter, 2004).

After entering the reformation era, the council increasingly has a strategic position, which is expected to create political, social, and legal conditions that can correct past mistakes and weaknesses. However, in reality, the council's capacity and reputation are less favorable (Sinukaban, 2020). Among other things, this is due to the weak capacity and integrity of the institution as a whole (Indrastuti et al., 2024). For example, in making regional regulation (legislation function), there is still a need to strengthen the substance by the council's supporting apparatus; this is due to the minimal support of expertise provided to complete the tasks (Palullungan et al., 2019).

Regarding budgetary tasks, in order not to be considered as always agreeing with the regional revenue and expenditure budget plans proposed by the regional government, the council still needs to improve its capabilities and capacities, especially those related to mastering the basic aspects of budgetary policy, including budgeting systems and procedures that are oriented towards regional development (Andang & Ali, 2022).

Implementing supervisory functions and duties for the entire governance process and regional development programs, specifically, is a challenge that can be risky and prove its credibility to the people. However, the weakness in the implementation of duties in reality often makes this authority fall into a political trap that can harm the entire process of regional governance (Zahorka et al., 2019) because political interests tend to dictate and make the supervisory function a political tool, not a tool for the council in supervising the effectiveness of the implementation of regional government policies (Matveeva et al., 2018).

These weaknesses are also compounded by the limited institutional capacity contribution the council secretariat provides in terms of excellent service to optimize council performance. In general, the council secretariat is weak because, so far, it has been a place or section for local government staff who are considered unproductive (Putri et al., 2022). In addition, the limited understanding of all the duties and functions of the council (outside of the limited budget and the settings for its existence) makes this council secretariat more positioned as a mere administrative servant of the council.

On the other hand, the council also negotiates priorities with the local government because it is suspected that there is a mechanism for sharing access to regional financial resources (Ansori, 2023) because some council members are also businessmen or at least have connections with businessmen. In some cases, the public also criticized the council and local government because various documents related to the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (Indonesian: Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, abbreviated as APBD) were not open to the public and were considered confidential documents. This happened because the council and local government were suspected of having some deal behind the public, so the public did not know about it (Direktorat Penelitian dan Pengembangan, 2006).

One of the weaknesses that can cause friction between the legislative and executive institutions is the unclear regulatory framework that provides a basis for implementing the supervisory function by the council. When compared to the other two functions of the council, the function of forming regional regulations (legislation) and budgetary, the implementation procedures of the supervisory function, especially those related to the system, are not very detailed. In general, the regulation of the supervisory function by the council in laws and regulations only focuses on its object or scope. Even then, it is formulated in broad terms and does not mention its synergy with other supervisory institutions that also have supervisory functions both structurally, functionally, and in the depth of their objects (Melati et al., 2021).

Several things have been identified as a reasons why the board's supervisory function couldn't carried out effectively and optimally (Ansori & Nuraini, 2021), and here is the list of them:

- a. The existing structure within the council institution is very small;
- b. The council's secretariat and its equipment are not equipped/supported by adequate equipment yet, especially regarding full and useful information;
- c. Its implementation is not based on a network mechanism that involves many elements in the region yet;
- d. There is no institutionalization of systems and procedures for better feedback yet.

The capacity of the council to carry out its duties and functions, including the supervisory function, must be kept in the election system used to recruit prospective council members to become council members (Wettstein et al., 2019). Several factors can correlate with the quality of council members, which ultimately affects the institutional performance of the council (Irwansyah, 2022): first, voter recognition of the parliamentary capacity of the prospective representatives whose names and photos are listed on the ballot paper. Recognition of the figure alone is considered insufficient because famous figures often need the work capacity expected by voters and local governments to work together.

Second, the council needs to fulfill various supporting capacities. No matter how good the individual quality of the elected council members is, if they do not have adequate facilities to carry out their functions and duties, then the council, with all its supporting tools and structures, will not have optimal capacity and performance. Third, the readiness of other governance parties in the political process or the implementation of regional government. Even if council members are elected directly and filled by more qualified members, civil society and the public do not push regional agendas in a structured and systematic manner, then the council will not have significant challenges.

2. METHODOLOGY

This study is the result of doctrinal or normative legal research, all of the information is obtained through secondary data, such as material or information sourced from primary legal materials in the form of laws and regulations or all authoritative documents; secondary legal materials in the form of research results, articles, scientific activity reports, books and other legal materials used to strengthen primary legal materials; as well as tertiary legal materials in the form of dictionaries, encyclopedias, and other materials or information that used to support primary legal materials and secondary legal materials (Irwansyah, 2022).

This study is prescriptive, presenting legal events with legal rules or legal norms, as well as linking legal norms with legal principles and linking legal principles with ethics, so that this prescriptive study unites the description into one understanding into a coherent truth, has conformity between one statement and another (Diantha, 2016). This prescriptive nature is a substantial thing that cannot be studied by other disciplines whose objects are also law. Meanwhile, the technical nature shows that this study establishes standard procedures, provisions, and guidelines for implementing a legal rule (Marzuki, 2009).

This study also uses some approaches to obtain information from various aspects regarding the legal issues explained. The approaches that will be used in this study are the statute and conceptual approaches.

The legislative approach is carried out by examining all laws and other regulations related to the legal issue being studied, like issues relating to the position of the regional house representative council, the functions that must be carried out, especially the supervisory function, and the expected impact, such as the realization of good regional governance.

Sources of information or legal materials in this study can be primary and secondary legal materials. Primary legal materials are legal materials that have authoritative characteristics attached to them, which means the legal materials have authority. Primary legal materials consist of laws and regulations and judges' decisions. At the same time, secondary legal materials consist of all publications on law that are not positive law. The publications on law are textbooks, legal dictionaries, legal journals, and comments on court decisions (Hartono, 1994).

This study's methods or analytical techniques for the legal materials are descriptive, interpretive, systematic, argumentative, and evaluative. The descriptive technique encompasses both the content and structure of positive law. In this descriptive phase, the study presents and determines the meaning of the legal rules under examination. Thus, it merely outlines the existing state of affairs at this stage.

Based on this descriptive method and approach, we hoped that various problems could be described completely and comprehensively so that the results of the problem analysis could be used as a basis for knowing more about the law, especially the applicable written law, and can be used to provide solutions to existing problems.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1. The ups and downs of the Board's supervisory function

When the Republic of Indonesia Law Number 22 of 1999 was still in effect, it gave the council quite a big authority. The complexity of implementing the supervisory function increases when it enters the trap of power politics. A regional head election system that was not implemented directly (Labolo & Afif Hamka, 2012) resulted in the need for regional heads to obtain strong support from the council so that if there was dissatisfaction by certain forces within the council, it triggered the use of the council's authority through the supervisory function as an initial process to overthrow the regional head.

However, with the enactment of Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 32 of 2004, which revoked Law Number 22 of 1999 and is currently replaced by Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 23 of 2014, such conditions can be avoided, the only problem now does not lie in a relationship that brings each other down, but it is worth questioning how to optimize the implementation of the supervisory function (Syaripudin et al., 2021) by the desires expected from the existence of this function.

Legally, the implementation of the supervisory function performed by the council, as stipulated in various laws governing regional governance, is consistently addressed within their respective articles. For instance, Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 23 of 2014, in Article 96 paragraph (1) letter c and Article 149 paragraph (1) letter c, indicates that there is, in substance, no difference in the scope of the object overseen by the council. As a follow-up to this law, the President issued Government Regulation Number 12 of 2017 concerning the Development and Supervision of the Implementation of Regional Government, which states in Article 20 paragraph (1) that supervision by the regional House representative council pertains to the policies enacted by the regional head.

This is different from the conditions developing in the center of governance, changes in political dynamics have led members of the Indonesian House of Representatives to become more active and critical in supervising the government and state institutions. Almost none of the executive's movements escape from the council member's oversight, either through statements by council members that represent factions and parties in various media or through direct meetings with the government and state institutions as a form of supervision function in meetings or hearings (Daly, 2017). The face-to-face forum between the council and the government is an actual momentum for council members to supervise the government.

Alongside strengthening the Council's functions during and after the reformation era, the efficiency of hearing time in working meetings and public hearings with the supervised institutions or related bodies has posed a unique challenge (Denoeux & Desfosses, 2007). This challenge stems from the inadequate time management utilized for evaluating institutional performance and extracting information from those institutions. Management of time in working meetings and public hearings is often driven by the enthusiasm of Council members to pose questions and interrupt discussions on issues or statements emerging during the meetings, especially when the meeting's leadership needs to control the proceedings effectively.

The capacity of council members in face-to-face forums with the government through working meetings or hearings will be determined by their mastery of the problems and data/information being asked or discussed (Regonini, 2017), their articulation ability to convey their views, and their understanding of the rules of the game in the trial (Pelechaty, 2022).

As is known, the 1999-2002 People's Consultative Assembly session, implemented with the spirit of reformation, has changed the face of Indonesian people's representative institutions both at the center and in the regions. It is marked by the People's Consultative Assembly no longer being the Supreme State Institution, its authority has also been cut, and the council which was previously an institution that stamped the government, was given stronger authority, especially the power to form laws. On top of that, a new state institution called the Regional Representative Council is directly elected by the people in general elections. Moreover, the amendment to the constitution also strengthens the council's existence by explicitly stating that there are councils in the regional government of provinces, districts, and cities.

Nevertheless, there is an evaluation that the changes to the Constitution, which emphasize the legislative, budgetary, and supervisory functions of both the House of Representatives and the Regional House of Representatives—implemented, among other ways, through the rights of interpellation, inquiry, and expression of opinion, alongside the right of members to pose questions, submit proposals and opinions, as well as immunities—are not fully articulated in the current legislation regarding the structure and position of the People's Consultative Assembly, the House of Representatives, the Regional House of Representatives, and the Regional Representative Councils. It is felt that a reevaluation and restructuring are necessary, as there exists a perception that the existing laws do not fully capture the mandates of the constitutional amendments and that there have not been significant changes in their implementation, particularly in the oversight function (Ridlwani & Mochtar, 2019). As a result, the representative institutions have not effectively served as controllers of the government (Pelechaty, 2022)

This is often experienced due to the weak legal consequences of a meeting between the Government and the Council (Poole, 2014). Sometimes the results of the agreement in the meeting can be refuted by internal meetings of the Government (Prihandini & Muslim, 2023). Meanwhile, from the internal side, the people's representative institutions have not made many changes internally, this is indicated by the current trial and decision-making mechanisms, which are not much different from the previous conditions, the very least that happened is the meetings held are trapped in submitting questions from the council and answered by the government. Meanwhile, what is expected is that the atmosphere of the working meeting will reflect the debate, focus, and completion of the issues discussed (Dharmasaputra, 2007).

3.2. The role of the council's supervisory function in the future

The supervisory function of the council in the future -according to its institutional capacity- can take on roles and reposition its functions to align with the issues developed in society (Abazi, 2014), such as eradicating corruption, collusion, and nepotism. This is easier to realize if:

- a. There is a political commitment to uphold ethics and commendable behavior (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2012);
- b. take advantage of opportunities by proving to constituents that they are a clean representative institution/public institution (Poptcheva, 2019);
- c. able to reach or access complete information from various government and non-government institutions (Fitsilis, 2021);
- d. seeking and gaining support from the community and various community institutions by sharing information with the public (Fitsilis & Todd, 2022);
- e. involving the community in preparing the monitoring agenda (Straussman & Renoni, 2011);
- f. open resource, specifically regarding funding sources and budgets (Jong et al., 2013).

Several requirements must be met by the council as institutional capital, either through its members, its supporting apparatus, or the political parties that place their people on the council, including:

- a. the existence of political will from all members of the council and political parties that place their representatives on the council to change or build or improve their good image in the eyes of the public (Yuliawati & Asri, 2024) by fulfilling the agenda that was promised during the election campaign and controlling the behavior of the council not to carry out acts of corruption, collusion, and nepotism;
- b. there is a shared belief among the members and the council's apparatus regarding the mission and commitment to making the council a clean institution (Mungiu, 2005) by formulating it into council rules or code of ethics and implementing it;
- c. the existence of an institutionalized value system through consistent implementation of procedures and mechanisms for each supervisory agenda (Almoatasm, 2020), which is outlined in the rules and codes of ethics that have been formulated from time to time or from period to period;
- d. the existence of a well-established internal supervisory support system through both administrative and substantive arrangements (Tremblay, 2007), such as clear measures of internal supervisory performance in a transparent and fair manner and the implementation of a cross-check mechanism for institutions supervised by other council apparatuses,

- e. the existence of a well-established and adequate incentive system for members and council equipment that carries out supervisory functions (Shomer, 2015). This is to avoid using authority to carry out supervisory functions to mobilize economic resources due to the use of council membership positions by outside parties (political parties or others).

In addition to the considerations above, the structuring through council regulations should not be overlooked, as it encourages the emergence of alternative ideas by allowing factions to grant their members the freedom to express their opinions (Milić, 2023). There are indications that, until now, council members have been constrained by faction rules. Meanwhile, some factions still appear undemocratic, highlighting the views of a select few political party leaders.

In addition, if in previous periods, political parties and the government were considered to have given less consideration to gender balance (Erikson & Josefsson, 2022), then the current situation has changed after the Law on General Elections and the Law on the Composition and Position of the People's Consultative Assembly, the People's Representative Council, the Regional Representative Council, and the Regional People's Representative Council were revised and provided much more real opportunities for women. Politicians are at least trying to provide a place for female legislative candidates. However, this is not an easy step because at least these efforts cannot be separated from the role and persistent efforts of the Indonesian Parliamentary Women's Caucus of the People's Representative Council (Indonesian: *Kaukus Perempuan Parlemen Indonesia Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*) (Mukarom, 2022).

Similar to the determination of leadership positions within the council's supporting bodies, there are, in fact, no normative regulations that require women to be given designated space or greater opportunities to attain such positions. The selection of leaders or secretaries of these supporting bodies is conducted democratically through voting. Therefore, female members' activity and political influence are critical determining factors (Ruriana et al., 2023). Both supportive and opposing opinions exist regarding the empowerment of women's roles in this political arena.

As for the groups that agree to provide certain quotas for women, this view is based on the assumption that women need a greater initial opportunity (Hillman, 2018) to develop themselves as politicians in the regions. If they are immediately faced with open competition, their experience and capacity are less ready than male politicians. However, other groups believe that women must demonstrate their experience and capacity in politics from the start. Without adequate skills, women could become a mental burden for themselves because the world they face is relatively harsh.

In certain cases, as presented in the research results (Djojosoekarto, 2004) stated that a special training program was held for novice politicians by the United Development Party of Samarinda City (Indonesian: *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Kota Samarinda*) have women as the most of the participants with a composition of 85% women and 15% men. However, when electing the heads of the groups in the training, it turned out that almost all the heads were men. Therefore, there is a perspective that, although political parties are committed to providing significantly better positions for women on the list of legislative candidates, it is essential to avoid coercion in the nomination process (Hamade, 2003).

However, some political parties carry out cadre formation with a different approach, determining the serial number of legislative candidates with a ratio of 3:1 or 2:1 for male and female candidates. This cadre formation process seems forced, but some political parties consider that if serious encouragement efforts are not made, it may be difficult to get reliable female politicians (Haryanti, 2012).

In many countries, the unequal status of women compared to men remains profoundly evident, prompting the use of a welfare approach to enhance women's status (Rahmi, 2022), there are even efforts directed toward prioritizing gender issues, undertaken by governments, communities, and multilateral institutions. Such tendencies are, in fact, inconsistent with the notion that women are responsible individuals who not only possess the right to choose but must also engage actively in the processes unfolding within a democratic society.

There is indeed no correlation between the level of development success and gender equality, except in several developing countries that have high women's activities and breakthroughs, including India, South Africa, and Jamaica (Oquist, 2003). From the results of an investigative study in 1999 entitled "Are women really the fairer sex" (Dollar et al., 1999), the implications for the presence of women in the political arena and

government efficiency are very large, including in the results of the study, it stated that there is a close relationship between women's representation in parliament and a decrease in corruption cases.

3.3. Corruption, collusion, and nepotism as challenges to the implementation of the supervisory function

The main tasks and functions of the council as stipulated in the laws and regulations include three things, namely: first, the legislative function or making regulations (legislation), in this case regional regulations; second is the budgetary function or the preparation and determination of the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget; and third is the supervisory function, especially regarding the implementation of various laws and regulations and policies in the region.

The two functions of the council, legislation and budgeting, are the implementation of the public policy-making function (Kithatukiwekete & Jahed, 2019). Meanwhile, the supervisory function is very substantial. The scope of the council's supervisory function must be interpreted in a broader sense, not just an evaluation of the performance of the local government in implementing various public policies. The council must also supervise various public policies implemented by other governance parties, namely the community and the private sector. However, in this study, supervision is aimed at public policies implemented by the local government.

The supervisory function of the council, if implemented effectively, will be able to optimize the performance and integrity of various regional public institutions (Benton & Russell, 2013). The supervisory function can be directed toward eradicating corruption, collusion, and nepotism; however, this can only be realized if the council itself undergoes genuine reform to ensure a clean operation. Consequently, implementing this supervisory function should begin within the council before extending to external parties. One approach the council can take to build integrity and enhance the effectiveness of public institutions at the regional level is to collaborate with law enforcement agencies and civil society organizations to establish networks with supervisory parties (Fitsilis & De Vrieze, 2020).

There are indications that the granting of regional autonomy is not accompanied by adequate institutional capacity, systems, and procedures to maintain accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency, which often leads to the prevalence of corrupt practices, collusion, and nepotism in its implementation (Blaser-Mapitsa, 2022). Furthermore, the existence of the council in its capacity as a representative institution (at the regional level), which should serve as a pillar of hope in combating corruption, collusion, and nepotism, has ironically become the target of criticism due to allegations that the council is involved in various political negotiations that result in such practices. If this situation is accurate and allowed to persist, potentially involving only a subset of members, it could significantly undermine the overall credibility of the council, thereby rendering its oversight function ineffective (Rozzoli, 2012).

There are two opposing views on economic growth/life. The first view is that corruption can positively impact economic growth. This view is based on the reason that corruption manifested in the form of grease money or bribes can accelerate business licensing and spur rapid investment development. However, the second view is the opposite, namely that corruption can have a negative impact on economic growth (Alfada, 2019) because it increases production costs and business affairs, which can affect investment costs.

3.4. Collaboration based on political power

A research study found that the collaboration between local governments and councils can undermine councils' critical stance and determination in performing their supervisory functions. The findings revealed that civil society organizations have raised important issues to the council, but these did not receive significant follow-up due to the strong collaboration between the two elements of local government, which resulted in whatever was presented to the council not garnering the attention expected by the community. The public hopes that political parties should also improve such conditions; however, this improvement has yet to materialize in practice. This parallel attitude is attributed to most council members being party leaders, allowing them to control the party's stance on various important issues (Dwiyanto, 2003).

The enhancement of the council's supervision function encounters obstacles when a political deal occurs between the council and the local government, moreover involving third parties in agreements regarding the execution of contract work as a form of business allocation. The empowerment of supervisory functions needs to be broadened by incorporating aspects of performance oversight of the council by civil society. Various emerging civil society organizations that monitor the council need to be strengthened. They should be enabled

to participate in the implementation of the council's functions. There are three ways to engage civil society in these activities:

- socialization about the structure and dynamics of representative institutions and how to influence the decisions of these legislative institutions (Malik, 2023);
- the Establishment of a legislative watchdog institution that can monitor the council's agenda, its institutional performance, and the records and achievements of each member (Mandelbaum, 2011);
- development of legislative advocacy strategies that can be implemented or further developed by each civil society institution's institutional mandate (Heiss, 2019).

The effectiveness of this parliamentary supervisory mechanism hinges on the council's responsiveness to the feedback provided. The efficacy of dialogue between the council and the public necessitates three prerequisites (Truan, 2021): the intensity of public dialogue with the council, the level of public attendance at hearings, and the number of proposals or inputs from the public that are viable for follow-up.

The council or the local government should consider the views of civil society. This situation arises from a mutual understanding between the two institutions, as each institution's interests are safeguarded from one another. Consequently, various public information disseminated by the mass media often needs to receive adequate follow-up from civil society, which tends to be passive. In other words, the feedback and supervisory mechanisms for government institutions cannot be effectively implemented (Maricut-Akbik, 2021).

While input through hearings and demonstrations that are often carried out in the council is still considered ineffective, in order for such input to be easily followed up, civil society institutions and the mass media need to be equipped with the ability to formulate policy recommendations (Meinel, 2018). Input like this must be in accordance with the target of change or improvement desired by the institutions that provide feedback to the council.

For input to be effective for the council, two aspects of parliamentary socialization need to be considered (Lovenduski, 2013): the type and scope of information services for the public and the level of public response to the council's information services. In addition, the availability of the same data and information is needed (Koryzis et al., 2021) so that all parties in governance speak and act based on reality. Data and information from the council can also come from follow-up to public complaints to the council. This is in line with the council's duties as stated in the rules of procedure, which the council must pay attention to and channel aspirations, receive complaints from the public, and facilitate follow-up resolution.

In addition, the correlation between the balance of political power within the council and the political party affiliation of the regional head currently in office is also suggested to influence supervisory effectiveness. However, this has yet to be empirically validated. However, there is an assumption that if the balance of political power is not linear, it may impact the council's supervisory functions (Luttrell et al., 2014) and the smooth execution of the regional head's duties.

4. CONCLUSION

As one of the council's roles, the supervisory function continues to play a crucial part in monitoring the local government's administration. While the council's supervisory capacity may not be as robust as it was at the outset of the reformation era, it remains an essential instrument for ensuring that local governance stays on course, promotes clean governance, and helps avoid corrupt practices characterized by collusion and nepotism, provided this supervisory function is executed earnestly. However, the council faces several challenges in carrying out its supervisory function, including the persistence of outdated paradigms, the involvement of some council members in corruption, collusion, and nepotism, and, importantly, the weakness of collaboration based on political power.

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