

Collaboration in Land Conflict Resolution

(A Socio-Legal Study Employing a Multi-Actor Mediation Approach in the City of Surabaya)

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ABSTRACT

Land conflicts are often caused by a lack of coordination between the various parties involved, ranging from local communities and the government to law enforcement agencies. Uncertainty in land management and ownership triggers legal uncertainty that can impact social and economic stability in the region. When land does not have a clear or registered ownership status, communities do not have a strong legal basis to defend their claims. This often causes tension between individuals or groups, which ultimately has the potential to develop into physical conflict or even broader social escalation. This study uses a qualitative method with a sociological approach to law through case studies, which aims to determine whether collaborative governance can be applied in handling land conflicts with a multi-actor mediation approach in the city of Surabaya, namely: 1). Initial Conditions Dimension (system context) 2). Joint Engagement Process (principled engagement) 3). The process of agreeing on shared motivation 4). The process of utilizing capacity for joint action. To identify the factors behind multi-actor mediation in resolving land conflicts in the city of Surabaya, namely: a). Trust between actors. b). Distribution of power. c). Commitment to participate in the mediation process. The results of this study show that land conflicts in Surabaya are complex, multi-actor, and of high economic value. Land conflicts hinder development, increase costs, and damage reputation. The community wants legal certainty, justice, humane compensation/relocation, and a voice that is truly heard. Capacity in the form of land data, certificate legality, and technical teams; the obstacles are that the data is not yet integrated and human resources are limited. The resolution of land conflicts through multi-actor mediation in Surabaya is highly dependent on the capacity for joint action possessed and exercised by each party. The factors behind multi-actor mediation in resolving land conflicts in the city of Surabaya are: mediation of land conflicts in the city of Surabaya. The National Land Agency (BPN) emphasizes that trust is built through data transparency, consistency of rules, and neutrality. The central issue in land conflict mediation is the distribution of power. The imbalance of power, especially between companies with large capital, legal access, and political support on one side, and communities with limited resources on the other, is the main root of the conflict. Commitment is a determining factor in the success of land conflict mediation. All actors, including the BPN, notaries/PPAT, city government, NGOs, legal practitioners, and the community, emphasize that without commitment, mediation will only be a formality that does not substantively resolve conflicts.

Keywords: Collaborative Governance, Land conflict, Multi Actor.

1. INTRODUCTION

Land conflicts in Indonesia are a complex and growing problem (Kurniawan, 2014). These conflicts are triggered by various factors, such as unclear land ownership status, minimal land registration processes, and legal uncertainty (Gold & Zuckerman, 2014; Iswantoro, 2021). Data from the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (Kemen ATR/BPN) shows that the majority of land in Indonesia has not been officially registered, either in terms of control or ownership. This condition leads to numerous disputes that are often protracted and difficult to resolve (Bedner, 2016; Timmer, 2016).

The ongoing land conflicts are heavily influenced by Indonesia's vast land area (Bedner, 2016). According to the 2020 Population Census, Indonesia covers an area of 1.92 million km² with a population density of 141 people per km², and a total population of 270.20 million, increasing by approximately 3.26 million people annually at a growth

rate of 1.25% per year (BPS, 2021). These geographic and demographic conditions are the main triggers for land conflicts (Bedner, 2016; Lucas et al., 2015). The Strategic Plan of the Directorate General for Dispute and Conflict Management, Ministry of ATR/BPN, reveals that population growth and Indonesia's transition to an industrialized nation have made land management and spatial planning more complex and strategic (Bedner, 2016; Lucas et al., 2015). It was also emphasized that land conflicts could escalate into protracted disputes that trigger physical conflict between the parties involved, thus potentially disrupting national political stability (Lucas et al., 2015).

Land disputes in Indonesia generally take the form of disputes and conflicts triggered by the large amount of unregistered land, both in terms of control and ownership (Bedner, 2016; Gold & Zuckerman, 2014; Lucas et al., 2015). This unclear land registration status often results in legal uncertainty, triggering complex disputes and conflicts (Bedner, 2016; Gold & Zuckerman, 2014). According to 2021 data from the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (KemenATR/BPN), the majority of cases, 90.8%, occurred between individuals, while the remainder involved individuals with legal entities and others. 2019 data from the same center states that Indonesia has 191 million hectares of land, with 124 million hectares as forest and 67 million hectares as non-forest land, further divided into state land, customary land, and land rights. The imbalance between land area and population growth increases the risk of land disputes and conflicts. In response to potential and ongoing land conflicts, strategic action is needed to support public order and security. This approach involves data analysis and appropriate methods to prevent security disturbances from occurring. This policy is part of the 2020-2024 Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency, which focuses not only on resolving cases but also on preventing new ones through collaboration with various parties.

The urgency of conflict prevention efforts through maintaining public security and order is crucial and strategic in achieving sustainable social stability. Social conflict can arise for various reasons, including sharp economic, social, political, or ethnic differences among various community groups (Barron et al., 2016; Kelman, 2008). If not handled properly and strategically, these conflicts can develop into serious threats to national integrity and security. Therefore, the importance of the participation of all parties, including the government, civil society, and non-governmental organizations, in conflict prevention efforts cannot be underestimated. In the context of Indonesia, a country with extremely high diversity, both in terms of ethnicity, culture, religion, and socio-economic, efforts to maintain public security and order are crucial (Lucas et al., 2015; Timmer, 2016). Various cases of conflict that have occurred in the past demonstrate the importance of maintaining national harmony and unity to avoid greater social disintegration. The Indonesian government has implemented various policies in the context of conflict prevention, one of which is through a police approach that is not only oriented towards law enforcement but also towards conflict prevention (Kelman, 2008).

Land conflict resolution in Indonesia is grouped into three categories: Unresolved, In Process, and Resolved. This doughnut chart shows the distribution of conflicts based on their resolution status, presented in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total number of conflicts. Unresolved covers 251 cases, or 45% of the total number of conflicts, indicating that nearly half of the land conflicts have not yet received initial action. This indicates obstacles in the initial handling of cases, either due to limited resources, lack of prioritization, or the complexity of the cases themselves. In Process, with 268 cases or 48% of the total number of conflicts, indicates that most conflicts are in the resolution stage. While this reflects efforts to resolve the conflict, this status also indicates that these conflicts have not yet reached the final resolution stage and require more intensive follow-up. On the other hand, only 43 cases (8% of the total number of conflicts) have been successfully resolved, indicating a low level of conflict resolution compared to the total number of existing conflicts.

The data demonstrates an imbalance in conflict management, with the majority of conflicts falling into the "Not Yet Handled" and "In Process" categories, while only a small proportion have been resolved. The high number of unresolved conflicts poses a serious challenge, as this situation has the potential to worsen the conflict situation if not addressed promptly, risking escalation of tensions on the ground. The low percentage of resolved cases (8%) highlights the need for more effective strategies to accelerate the conflict resolution process, including through strengthening institutional capacity, improving inter-agency coordination, and utilizing alternative mechanisms such as mediation or arbitration. Furthermore, given the complexity of land conflicts, approaches that involve transparency, community participation, and recognition of customary rights and local laws are crucial. This reflects the significant challenges in managing land conflicts in Indonesia.

With the majority of conflicts still at the "Unaddressed" and "In Progress" stages, there is an urgent need to improve the conflict management system to increase efficiency and prevent future escalation. This can be achieved through cross-sector collaboration, regulatory improvements, and innovations in conflict resolution mechanisms, resulting in more effective, strategic, and sustainable solutions.

A strategic approach to conflict prevention involves a comprehensive and multifaceted approach, encompassing social, economic, political, and cultural aspects (Barron et al., 2016; Bedner, 2016; Gold & Zuckerman, 2014; Iswantoro, 2021). This effort involves community empowerment, improving welfare, developing quality education, and enforcing fair and equitable law enforcement (Gold & Zuckerman, 2014). Community empowerment is expected to increase social resilience in the face of potential conflict. Improving welfare aims to reduce economic disparities, which are often a root cause of conflict. Quality education is essential for developing intelligent and critical citizens who are able to understand and appreciate differences.

Furthermore, the active role of civil society organizations is crucial in monitoring and evaluating the implementation of government policies, as well as providing education and mediation to the public (Iswantoro, 2021; Kurniawan, 2014). These organizations can serve as a communication bridge between the government and the public, helping to identify and resolve potential issues that could trigger conflict. Furthermore, fair law enforcement is crucial for maintaining security and order. Fairly enforced laws foster a strong sense of justice among the public, which in turn fosters public trust in the judicial system and government. This trust is key to maintaining stability and preventing conflict.

The policing approach, particularly in Indonesia, has also evolved from focusing solely on reacting to conflict or crime to becoming more proactive in conflict prevention (Beckmann, 2017; Claudia, 2023; Endriyana et al., 2023). This is achieved through a "community policing" strategy that emphasizes building positive relationships between the police and the community. The police serve not only as law enforcers but also as protectors, guardians, and servants of the community. This approach places greater emphasis on dialogue, mediation, and the proportional use of force when necessary.

Land conflicts in East Java are spread across several regions, one of which is the city of Surabaya. This land conflict occurred in the West Surabaya area. West Surabaya is a fertile investment destination due to its high economic potential. Its strategic location attracts many investors to invest in buildings or housing. One of these developments has caused a prolonged and unresolved land conflict. The land conflict concerns the Sepat Reservoir, which covers an area of approximately 66,750 m² and is located in the neighborhood units (RW) 03 and 05 of Dukuh Sepat, Lidah Kulon sub-district, Lakarsantri district, Surabaya. The Sepat Reservoir conflict is a conflict between the developer, PT. Ciputra Surya Tbk., and the community living around the Sepat Reservoir, namely the Dukuh Sepat community. The conflict began with the issuance of the Mayor's Decree.

Surabaya No. 188.45/366/436.1.2/2008, with the approval of the Surabaya City Council with Decree No. 39 of 2008. The local community claims that the 6,675 hectare reservoir in the area is theirs and cannot be contested by the developer, namely: PT. Citra Land. However, according to the land status recorded at the Surabaya National Land Agency (BPN), the reservoir has legally become the property of the developer PT. Citra Land because of GS No. 109/S/1991 in registration No. 0335754. This land ownership status was obtained from a land swap process between the Surabaya City Government and the developer PT. Citra Land. The Surabaya city government has exchanged land in the Sepat Reservoir, Lidah Kulon sub-district, Lakarsantri district, Surabaya city which is considered state property with land in the Pakal sub-district, Pakal district which is currently used as the Surabaya Sport Center (SSC) or Gelora Bung Tomo Stadium (GBT).

In the case study of the land conflict that occurred in the Sepat Reservoir, residents rejected the government's policy by conducting a land swap with PT. Citra Land, because the land was still in dispute status, meaning that ownership was still being contested between the community and the Surabaya city government, while the facts on the ground showed that the reservoir still existed, and functioned as one of the important ecosystems for the community around the Sepat Reservoir. PT. Citra Land has carried out landfilling around the reservoir, the community is worried that if the reservoir is used as a place for building construction, it will have an impact on the community, namely: when rainfall is quite high and there is no rainwater reservoir it will cause flooding, this impact will certainly make it difficult for the Sepat Reservoir community. The period of the Sepat Reservoir land conflict has been going on for 10 years. However, the efforts made by the local community received repressive action from the police, one of which was the beating of a volunteer who was part of an alliance to reject the landfill action. The community's resistance was

assisted by several sympathetic parties, one of which was the Surabaya Legal Aid Institute (LBH). LBH provided legal assistance to resolve the Sepat Reservoir agrarian conflict and the repressive actions taken by the authorities against one of the volunteers.

In the context of Surabaya, land conflicts are often caused by a lack of coordination between the various parties involved, from local communities and the government to law enforcement agencies. Unclear land management and ownership trigger legal uncertainty that can impact social and economic stability in the area. When land lacks clear or registered ownership status, communities lack a strong legal basis to defend their claims (Ahyani, 2018; Endriyana et al., 2023; Gillespie, 2011; Tegan, 2015). This often leads to tensions between individuals or groups, which ultimately have the potential to escalate into physical conflict or even broader social escalation. Furthermore, weak law enforcement in the land sector further exacerbates the situation, with dispute resolution processes often slow and ineffective. Structuration theory, proposed by Anthony Giddens, states that social structures and individual actions mutually shape each other (Chatterjee et al., 2019). In the context of land disputes, this theory understands how legal structures influence individual actions and, conversely, how individual actions can influence changes in legal structures. This is relevant in analyzing how social and cultural norms influence the application of law in land dispute resolution. Land conflicts are multidimensional, structural, and complex, requiring not only legal resolution but also social, political, and institutional solutions through a collaborative, participatory, and equitable approach.

For facethis problem,approach collaborative Governance offers a comprehensive solution. Collaborative Governance is a framework in which various stakeholders with an interest in land issues—including the government, local communities, law enforcement officials, and the private sector—are involved in a collaborative decision-making process. This process is oriented towards consensus and deliberation, where all parties have an equal opportunity to voice their interests and views. In the context of resolving land conflicts in Surabaya City, a collaborative governance approach can be applied by involving all relevant actors, including local communities directly affected by the conflict, as well as local governments and law enforcement agencies. This approach emphasizes the importance of multi-stakeholder involvement in conflict mediation, with the government's role as facilitator and regulator, along with community involvement in the decision-making process, being key.

A collaborative approach to land conflict resolution not only helps resolve existing problems but also prevents new ones from emerging in the future. By involving all parties early on, potential conflicts can be detected and addressed early before they escalate into larger issues. This approach also fosters mutual trust among stakeholders, ultimately strengthening social cohesion and community stability. Thus, through collaborative governance, the government and communities can work together to create a more transparent and accountable land registration system and increase legal certainty for all parties. This approach also helps build the capacity of local communities to understand their land rights, enabling them to more actively participate in mediation and conflict resolution processes.

Land conflicts involving various actors, including civil servants, notaries, and the National Land Agency (BPN), reflect the complex dynamics that frequently arise in land issues in Indonesia. These disputes focus on ownership and rights to a plot of land and a house, where the civil servant, as the legal owner, challenges the validity of a deed issued by a notary. Legally, a notarial deed is considered a document with strong evidentiary force. However, in this case, the deed's validity is questioned because it allegedly contradicts the initial ownership claim of the civil servant. Furthermore, the BPN, which is responsible for issuing land certificates, is also being questioned regarding its administrative and verification procedures. This conflict not only touches on ownership but also involves the integrity of legal documents issued by notaries and the BPN's authority to manage land registration. Land conflicts involving property rights require a combination of legal approaches (rights clarification, enforcement mechanisms, compensation), governance/mediation approaches (social legitimacy, participation, joint fact-finding), and institutional reform. Political or governance negotiations alone are not enough because they do not change or guarantee the legal status of land rights which are at the heart of the conflict.

These three actors—the civil service, the notary, and the National Land Agency—have interrelated responsibilities that influence each other, requiring a more holistic and collaborative approach. A multi-actor mediation approach is relevant for analyzing how interactions between the parties can lead to a more effective resolution, given that each actor carries different interests and responsibilities. The civil service has the right to defend its property rights, the notary is responsible for the validity and accuracy of issued documents, and the National Land Agency (BPN) is obligated to ensure that all land administration processes comply with applicable regulations. In

dealing with this dispute, the courts also play a crucial role in evaluating the evidence presented and ensuring that land ownership rights are fairly protected in accordance with applicable law.

The Surabaya District Court's decision No. 288/Pdt.G/2017 reflects the complexity of land disputes involving various actors, namely civil parties, notaries, and the National Land Agency (BPN). In this case, the civil parties, as the legal owners of the land and buildings, challenged the validity of the deeds issued by the notaries and questioned the role and responsibility of the BPN in issuing certificates that they claimed contradicted the original ownership. The issues that arose in this dispute were not only related to ownership, but also involved the validity of the documents issued by the notaries and the land administration managed by the BPN.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Collaboration Theory (Collaborative Governance)

This theory will be the primary theory because the research focuses on the application of collaborative governance in land conflict management. Collaborative governance involves various stakeholders in a collective, consensus-oriented decision-making process to achieve shared solutions (Ansell et al., 2020; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Ansell & Torfing, 2022; Gordon, 2021). Collaborative Governance theory is an approach to collective decision-making that involves various parties or actors, including government, civil society, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector, to achieve common goals. This approach has become a key approach in resolving various social issues, including land conflicts in Indonesia (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Given the complexity of conflicts involving multiple stakeholders, Collaborative Governance offers a mechanism to encourage more inclusive, deliberative, and consensus-based cooperation (Akadun, 2023; Ansell & Gash, 2008).

2.2. Conflict Resolution Theory

Conflict is defined as a condition where the constantly changing environment in the corporate world plays a role in guiding conflict. Conflict is often created and recreated in 'intersubjectivity', that is, between people in their (misunderstanding) of each other (Erman, 2007). This shows that conflict can only be understood if people have a sense of familiarity with the same cultural norms (Erman, 2007). Meanwhile, Wehr (2002) defines conflict as "a situation in which actors use different behaviors towards each other to achieve incompatible goals and/or express their hostility" (Miller et al., 2003). Luhmann (1995) defines conflict as a communicated contradiction and emphasizes that conflict only occurs when expectations are communicated and resistance is communicated back (Holmström, 2007). Meanwhile, Litterer (1966) describes conflict as "a type of behavior that occurs when two or more parties oppose or fight each other due to the perception of relative inadequacy of activities or interactions with other people or groups (Litterer, 1966). This variety of conflict definitions reflects the many causes of conflict that can occur. Some potential causes of conflict in the workplace include management skills, access to development opportunities, and relationships between staff or between management and staff. Group conflict motives are closely related to the competitive aspects of group relationships and efforts to change those relationships (Miller et al., 2003).

2.3. Mediation Theory in Conflict

Mediation is a process in which a neutral third party helps individuals determine steps to resolve a conflict (Liebmann, 2000). The goal of mediation is to produce sustainable outcomes with a high level of satisfaction among the parties involved (Saundry et al., 2013). The goal of mediation is not always to resolve the dispute, but also to clarify expectations and rebuild relationships (Cloe & Goldsmith, 2000). The mediation process is often quick, requires a fraction of the cost of litigation, and offers a variety of styles to suit different situations. More and more organizations are turning to mediation as a faster and more affordable dispute resolution option. Collaborative efforts to resolve workplace conflicts have increased significantly in North America over the past 30 years (Brubaker, 2014). Research validated by a 2002 study showed a substantial decrease in the number of court applications (nearly 4,000 cases in two years) immediately after the introduction of mediation (Bennett, 2014). Although this research focuses specifically on the US Postal Service, the concept of mediation has spread widely across various professions and continues to evolve.

2.4. Anthony Giddens' Structuration Theory

Structuration theory, proposed by Anthony Giddens, states that social structures and individual actions mutually shape each other (Chatterjee et al., 2019). In the context of land disputes, this theory can help understand how legal structures influence individual actions and, conversely, how individual actions can influence changes in legal structures. This is relevant in analyzing how social and cultural norms influence the application of law in land dispute resolution. Anthony Giddens, born in London in 1938, is one of the most influential social theorists of the modern era. He earned a doctorate from the University of Cambridge and is known for his work linking various disciplines such as sociology, political science, and psychology. One of his most significant contributions to social theory was the development of structuration theory, formally outlined in his books **Central Problems in Social Theory** (1979) and **The Constitution of Society** (1984).

Structuration theory developed by Anthony Giddens offers an innovative analytical framework for understanding the dynamic relationship between social structure and human agency (Achmad, 2020; Chatterjee et al., 2019; Falkheimer, 2007; Giovine & Barri, 2024; Lamsal, 2012). In traditional social theory, there has been a long debate regarding the dominant role between structure as an element that determines human action and agency as an individual's ability to act independently and make decisions. Giddens, through structuration theory, introduced the concept of structural dualism, which emphasizes that structure and agency are not separate entities, but rather mutually shape and depend on each other (Chatterjee et al., 2019).

2.5. Legal Theory and Social Justice

This theory can be used to analyze aspects of justice and equality in handling land conflicts, ensuring that all parties receive fair treatment in mediation and decision-making processes. In discussions of law and social justice, it is important to understand that law in this context is law deliberately created by the state (by design), not law that arises naturally in society. Naturally occurring law is often known as customary law or customary law, which develops from social interactions between individuals within a society. This customary law is bottom-up, meaning it develops from society to the state, while law created by the state is top-down, meaning it is created by an authorized authority to regulate and control societal behavior.

2.6. Social Capital Theory in Collaborative Governance

The theory of social capital in collaborative governance emphasizes the crucial role of social networks, trust, and norms in facilitating cooperation between various actors to achieve common goals. Social capital refers to the resources individuals or groups acquire through their social networks, which can enhance collaborative capacity and accelerate decision-making processes. In the context of collaborative governance, social capital enables actors from the public, private, and civil society sectors to interact and cooperate more effectively. Social networks facilitate the flow of information and resources, while trust fosters deeper engagement and reduces transaction costs. Shared norms help create consistent and predictable behavioral expectations among actors, thereby minimizing the potential for conflict and uncertainty. This theory highlights how social capital can act as a glue that strengthens relationships between stakeholders, enhances the effectiveness of cooperation, and helps overcome barriers to collaborative governance, such as power differences and role ambiguity. Social capital, as a crucial element in collaborative governance, needs to be understood in depth. They stated that the main types of social capital that strengthen effective collaborative governance include: networks, trust, and norms. They also examined which types of social capital are most utilized at various phases in the collaborative governance process, including formation, process, and outcomes, as well as how social capital functions in various collaborative governance arenas such as structure, cognition, and content (Oh & Bush, 2016).

3. RESEARCH METHOD

This research uses a qualitative method with a sociological-of-law approach through a case study. It aims to understand how collaborative governance can be applied to land conflict resolution. This study takes the case of a land dispute in Surabaya as its object. Land conflicts in the region are often triggered by a lack of coordination and transparency in land management and ownership, resulting in legal uncertainty and prolonged social conflict. The focus of this research is:

- 1) Collaboration of the Parties in Handling Land Conflicts with a Multi-Actor Mediation Approach in the city of Surabaya using the theory of Emerson & Nabatchi, (2015), namely:
 - a. Initial Condition Dimension (System Context)
 - b. Principled Engagement Process
 - c. Shared motivation agreement process
 - d. The process of empowering joint action capacity (Capacity for joint action)
- 2) Factors underlying multi-actor mediation in resolving land conflicts in the city of Surabaya.
 - a. Trust between actors
 - b. Distribution of power
 - c. Commitment to follow the mediation process

Data analysis in this study was conducted both during the data collection process and after the data collection was completed within a certain period. The techniques used to analyze the data were descriptive techniques, more specifically using interactive models. According to Bogdan in Sugiyono (2012), data analysis is the process of systematically searching for and organizing data obtained from interviews, field notes, and other materials, so that the data can be easily understood and communicated to others. The interactive model described by Miles and Huberman, et. al (2014) includes four types of analysis activities: data reduction, data presentation, drawing conclusions, and data collection itself, which is a cyclical and interactive process.

4. DISCUSSION

4.1. Collaboration of the Parties in Handling Land Conflicts with a Multi-Actor Mediation Approach in the City of Surabaya.

1) Initial Condition Dimension (System Context)

Basically, collaborative governance placing public, private, and civil society actors in a forum facilitated by public authorities to make decisions through deliberation and consensus (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Therefore, the discussion The “Initial Condition Dimension (system context)” becomes crucial: collaboration never starts from zero, but is always shaped by the existing system context, such as the density of problems and resource limitations, policy and legal frameworks, socio-economic and cultural characteristics, actor network configurations, political dynamics and power relations, and the historical traces of conflict that influence the perceptions and attitudes of the parties (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). In urban land conflicts such as Surabaya, this initial context is usually increasingly complex due to high land values, layered actor interests, and differing claims that often rest on documents, memory of control, and social legitimacy. Consequently, multi-actor mediation designs are not sufficient alone. “bringing together” the parties, but musts from the outset read the system context as a framework of opportunities and limitations that determine the rhythm, risks, and critical points of collaboration.

Ansell and Gash (2008) assert that the initial conditions for collaboration can be mapped through key variables: a history of prior conflict or cooperation, actors' incentives to participate, imbalances in power and resources, leadership, and the forum's institutional design. These variables explain why in some cases collaborative forums develop productively, while in others they stagnate as repetitive formal meetings. A long history of conflict tends to breed suspicion, thus discouraging incentives. participation needs to be “converted” into rational and safe reasons for each parties to remain present. Imbalances of power and resources must be managed because they can lead to the dominance of powerful actors and make weak actors merely procedural accomplices. This is where collaborative leadership and institutional design come into play as process controllers: leadership maintains neutrality, agenda discipline, and the quality of deliberation; while institutional design establishes rules of the game, accountability mechanisms, and protections for vulnerable parties to ensure that process equality is truly operational (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

Furthermore, when collaborative forums begin to operate, Ansell and Gash (2008) show that the dynamics of the process generally move through mutually reinforcing components, namely face-to-face dialogue, trust building, commitment development, and shared understanding. This means that difficult initial conditions do not automatically thwart collaboration, as long as the forum is able to produce small, tangible progress as a result. “proof of work” for the parties. The logic of small wins important because it reduces tension, narrows the space for speculation, and paves the way for the formation of a more stable shared understanding, especially when the conflict contains differences in facts and differences in the legitimacy of claims (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Thus,

the reading of the initial condition dimension in this study confirms that the success of multi-actor mediation in land conflicts is very much determined by the accuracy of reading the system context, then translating it into institutional design and forum leadership that consciously closes the space for domination, clarifies participation incentives, and prepares the prerequisites for the growth of trust, commitment, and shared understanding.

The collaborative process itself is highly iterative and non-linear. The innovation stages can be carried out through two processes: collaboration and innovation. The collaborative process is carried out to address budget issues and strengthen inter-agency relationships in the development of e-government innovation. The collaborative process aims to reveal the division of interests and understanding among collaborating actors. This illustrates how a large number of institutions with different, but actually competing, goals (local stakeholders) can collaborate to address the interests of groups in a weak position (landowners). This research was conducted on a group of staff from each local stakeholder constituency who are oriented towards public service and use collaborative principles in their work (Christopher and Kerry, (2015).

Fosler (2002) in Subarsono (2016:176) explains that in collaborative cooperation the parties involved must consciously carry out alignment, shared vision and liabilities. All of this is done by mutual agreement. Collaborative Governance is based on the goal of jointly solving specific problems or issues for the involved parties. These parties are not limited to government and non-government agencies, as the principles of good governance involve civil society in the formulation and decision-making process. Collaboration is initiated based on the limited capacity, resources, and networks of each party, allowing collaboration to unite and complement various components that drive the successful achievement of shared goals. In formulating shared goals, visions, missions, norms, and values within the collaboration, each party holds an equal position, with the authority to make decisions independently, even though they are bound by mutual agreement.

In a collaborative process, it's crucial to establish a shared commitment to accelerate the collaboration. Without this commitment, the collaboration process will not be able to succeed satisfactorily without harming all parties involved. Collaborative commitment stems from trust, while trust is achieved through shared dialogue or collaboration. Face to face dialogue is an inseparable part of the collaboration process. As a form of shared commitment to accelerating and collaborating, the actors (stakeholders) handling of land conflicts improves the quality of network capacity so that it is more optimal in execution and authority.

Land conflicts were discovered in Surabaya during the research. Most land issues revolve around boundaries and ownership. Resource imbalances pose a challenge to the sustainability of collaborative governance. Various efforts have been made to organize to achieve collective action. One of the most successful organizational approaches is problem-solving through collaborative governance. Due to the need for people in various organizations to collaborate directly across institutional and sectoral boundaries, this approach allows for effective and efficient collaboration. Although structural gaps remain, hierarchies and collaborative processes allow for effective and efficient work (Kirk Emerson and Tina Nabatchi, 2015).

Furthermore, Kirk Emerson and Tina Nabatchi (2015) explain in Collaborative Governance Regimes The growing demand for cross-sector collaboration continues to drive growth in all areas with collaborative governance arrangements. This has led to an explosion of research-based and practice-based interest. Not only scholars but also the public are seeking to understand collaborative arrangements to resolve existing problems, particularly land disputes, which encompass a broad scope and involve the participation of communities, various institutions, and governments. This cross-sector collaboration continues to be pursued and developed professionally to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of land dispute management and prevention, preventing similar problems from occurring in the future.

Resource imbalances significantly disrupt collaboration processes, requiring a deeper understanding to empower stakeholders to their full potential. Academic human resource capacity is crucial for land conflict resolution, but this does not mean collaboration is impossible. Resource imbalances can be addressed if stakeholders are able to represent the interests of the entire community, not just their own groups. This is consistent with the fact that many stakeholders are unable to effectively represent stakeholders in collaboration. In many cases, organized stakeholders do not represent individuals within their stakeholder groups (Buanes et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 1993).

For the people of Surabaya, land is a living space, an economic resource, and a social identity. Conflict arises from a mismatch between formal legality (certificates) and social legitimacy (long-standing tenure). When claims

from the government or private sector fail to address social issues, residents feel threatened by the loss of their rights without justice. Therefore, land conflicts are a highly sensitive issue and require a fair, inclusive, and supportive mediation approach to the community's well-being.

Land conflicts in Surabaya, as depicted in interview data and research discussions, cannot be understood solely as technical administrative issues such as recording errors, overlapping documents, or database inconsistencies. Behind these administrative symptoms lies a deeper structural problem, namely the contestation over increasingly scarce land resources. high value, the clash between claims of “legal rights” based on formal documents and “historical rights” y based on long-standing control, as well as unequal power relations between citizens, government, and business actors. In situations like this, formal legal channels tend to face limitations because the dispute is not just about who is “right” in a document”, but also about who is “socially recognized” and how justice is realized in the process and outcome of settlements. This is why a socio-legal approach is relevant: land conflicts are an arena where law, economic interests, historical control, and social legitimacy intersect, all influencing each other.

Thus, the findings of this study can be formulated as follows:

- Finding 1** : Collaboration begins within an external environment that creates both opportunities and constraints, including resource conditions, legal policy frameworks, socioeconomic and cultural characteristics, actor networks, political and power dynamics, and the history of conflict. This context influences the general parameters and chances of success of mitigation/prevention policies. conflict land in Surabaya.
- Finding 2** : The main challenges to collaboration are power imbalances among stakeholders and the legacy of mistrust stemming from historical conflict; this requires designing processes that bridge the gaps of dominance of powerful actors.
- Finding 3** : LandLimited urban areas and high land values trigger multi-actor conflicts, characterized by overlapping certificates, differences in administrative data, claims by residents versus private/government entities, and long-standing control of state land without formal legal standing. The technical dimension is intertwined with the socio-historical one.
- Finding 4** : Resolution requires a multi-actor collaborative/mediation approach, not just formal legal channels.
- Finding 5** : The conflict is seen as threatening the right to life (residence, livelihood, identity). Land status is unclear, information is opaque, and economic interests are strong; communities are weak due to minimal legal literacy and limited documentation. The expectation: transparent, inclusive mediation. win-win, and social justice.
- Finding 6** : The main tension lies in the overlap between citizens' “legal rights” and “historical rights”. Project delays, rising costs, and reputational risks mean companies need government facilitation, clear compensation/relocation mechanisms, and structured dialogue.
- Finding 7** : Lack ofcoordination inter-actor (citizens, government, law enforcement), unclear management/ownership, and weak law enforcement weaken legal certainty and trigger escalation; this emphasizes the need Collaborative Governance.

2) Joint Engagement Process (Principled Engagement)

Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) emphasize Principled Engagement (principled engagement) occurs repeatedly, over time. This allows people with different substantive, relational, and identity goals to collaborate across their respective institutional, jurisdictional, or sectoral boundaries to solve problems, resolve conflicts, or create shared value. The components that formprinciple of engagement. According to Emerson and Nabatchi (2015), it consists ofdiscovery, definition, deliberation, and determination.

Joint Engagement Process (principled engagement) in collaborative governance, social dynamics are placed at the heart of collaborative work, because it is at this stage that the ideas, complaints and claims of the stakeholders are placed at the heart of collaborative work. parties are “processed” into a shared problem definition, solution options, andenforceable decisions. Within the framework collaborative governance regime, joint engagement is not just a meeting, but a series of practices that include issue discovery, problem formulation, deliberation, and decision-making, all of which must be supported by orderly procedures to produce legitimacy and enforceability (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Therefore, ideas can emerge from any space,

but to become operational policies they require an arena designed to be equal, transparent, and predictable: there are rules of the game, a clear agenda, legitimate representation, impartial facilitation, and an open data exchange mechanism. At this point, face-to-face dialogue functions as “social infrastructure” that secures two things at once, namely The quality of information exchange and procedural fairness, as collaborative decisions tend to be more acceptable when the parties perceive the process to be neutral, provide equal opportunity to speak, and allow for legitimate objections to be voiced (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Tyler, 2006). Operationally, the City Government acts as a liaison and balancer of public and private interests through facilitation, setting the pace of negotiations, and ensuring follow-up; the National Land Agency (BPN) maintains data integrity and legal certainty as a basis for joint fact finding so that disputes do not get caught up in a battle of claims; Notaries or PPAT bridge social consensus into binding legal documents so that agreements do not stop at moral commitments; NGOs maintain inclusivity by strengthening the bargaining power of vulnerable groups, closing information gaps, and ensuring the process is not dominated by powerful actors; while the community obtains a formal channel to influence the substance of decisions while providing social legitimacy to the results of mediation (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Innes & Booher, 2010). With this kind of engagement design, principled engagement working not only as a space for discussion, but also as a mechanism for producing decisions that are legitimate, procedurally fair, and more ready to be executed because they are built from the start on shared facts, equality of process, and binding follow-up.

Thus, the quality of collaboration in handling land conflicts is determined by four interdependent factors: forum design, information governance, legal binding force, and the level of inclusiveness and accountability to the public. This emphasis is important because land conflicts generally stem from power imbalances and differences in access to information. Without a fair process design, forums can easily become spaces of domination rather than resolution (Ansell & Gash, 2008). In the findings This research appears to be a logical sequence that “locks” into each other. First, engagement is opened through an equal, transparent, and predictable face-to-face forum, with the City Government acting as a liaison and facilitator to ensure equal opportunity for all parties to speak, while the National Land Agency (BPN) maintains neutrality and data integrity as a basis for legal certainty. Second, the basis for dialogue is strengthened through joint fact-checking supported by information and data systems. integrated, so that the parties move from “mutual claims” to “sharing a testable evidence base”, which in turn reduces suspicion and expand the space for resolution options (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012). Third, the outcomes of the dialogue are elevated through clear legal binding, so that agreements do not remain verbal promises or ethical commitments, but rather become decisions with certainty of content, implementation deadlines, and consequences if violated. Fourth, the meaningfulness of the process is maintained through the involvement of vulnerable groups, civil society assistance, and post-mediation monitoring, so that agreements do not stop at the negotiating table, but are actually transformed into actions on the ground. This sequence aligns with a collaborative governance framework that positions principled engagement, strengthening shared motivation, and the capacity for collective action as bridges from the process to actionable outcomes (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015), while also emphasizing that public acceptance of outcomes is strongly influenced by a sense of procedural justice, namely when the process is perceived as neutral, open, and providing equal opportunity (Tyler, 2006). Through this framework, the following research findings can be understood as a unified process that moves in stages from forum design, confirmation of the factual basis, legal binding, to monitoring implementation.

So, based on all the data collected and discussed in this research, the findings of this research context can be formulated as follows:

- Finding 8** : Engagement begins with a face-to-face forum designed to be equal, transparent, and predictable. The City Government acts as abridge builder which guarantees equal space for speech and consistent follow-up, while the BPN maintains neutrality and data integrity as a support for legal certainty.
- Finding 9** : Engagement process fenced by joint fact-finding with a shared information architecture so that all parties share the same factual basis. The use of information technologies such as online databases and spatial systems enhances transparency, reduces information asymmetry, and makes cross-examination of evidence more efficient in deliberative forums.–consensus.
- Finding 10** : Engagement it doesn't stop at the discussion stage; the agreement is bound by a clear legal instrument, with government support as the enforcer of the results. This orientation addresses the

need for certainty of implementation and prevents roll back or unilateral claims post-mediation, as emphasized by business actors who want a binding mediation forum.

Finding 11 Meaningful engagement requires the involvement of vulnerable groups through civil society support and post-mediation monitoring mechanisms. The role of NGOs and CSOs is to strengthen procedural justice, maintain accountability, and ensure that forum decisions are sound—truly transformed into implementation in the field.

3) The process of agreeing on Joint Motivation (Shared Motivation)

The process of agreeing on shared motivations in collaborative land conflict resolution through multi-actor mediation is essentially a stage of “sewing goals” across parties so that diverse interests that were previously in conflict can converge in a single, agreed-upon course of action. Within a collaborative governance framework, shared motivations do not emerge automatically, but are built through purposeful, repeated, and accountable interactions, allowing the parties to gradually agree on the same reasons why the conflict must be resolved, what standards are considered fair, and what forms of outcomes are mutually acceptable (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). In this phase, trust-building becomes a key mechanism, as trust grows as parties get to know each other through consistent meetings, observe reasonable and consistent behavior, and experience tangible evidence that the other party can be relied upon to uphold their agreements. Trust also makes the process more efficient by reducing suspicion, accelerating information exchange, and expanding the space for shared learning in formulating resolution options (Ansell & Gash, 2008). In other words, shared motivation is not just a “common goal” on paper, but a collective willingness to bear the consequences of the process, share data and responsibility, and commit to the same outcome.

In practice, this stage is often the most fragile because each party almost certainly brings vested interests and past experiences that shape prejudices. Citizens may feel disadvantaged or exploited, business actors may feel hampered and face cost and reputational risks, while the government and land agencies face demands for legal certainty and social stability. When suspicions remain strong, collaboration can easily be reduced to formalities: attending forums but withholding information, agreeing on general points without commitment to implementation, or maintaining individual strategies outside the forum. Therefore, trust-building must be understood as institutional work, not simply a moral imperative. Trust needs to be supported by clear and fair procedures, such as transparency of relevant information, equal opportunity to speak, traceable minutes, and consistent follow-up, because acceptance of outcomes is strongly influenced by the parties' experiences of procedural fairness throughout the process (Tyler, 2006). In line with this, a healthy partnership requires a sense of mutual trust and equality in sharing roles, benefits and responsibilities, so that no party feels that they are merely being used as a “legitimacy stamp” without any real influence on the substance of the decision (Goddard, 2006).

Thus, strengthening shared motivation in multi-actor land conflict mediation requires two simultaneous actions: agreeing on realistic collective goals and building trust through verifiable practices. In this context, the government requires consistency as a liaison and balancer, land institutions require open official data and strict standards of proof, business actors require transparency in plans and commitment to fulfilling social obligations, while citizens need assurance that their voices matter and that the agreements are actually implemented. If this sequence is successful, shared motivation will shift from a mere “desire for peace” to a collective energy to resolve the dispute, all the way to the technical implementation, as each party sees plausible benefits and trusts that the process will not betray them (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012).

The National Land Agency (BPN) occupies a central position as the guardian of legal certainty in land conflicts, as the success of mediation depends heavily on one fundamental principle: that the agreement must be based on valid, verifiable, and legally recognized land data. Within the framework of governance, collaborative, the role of BPN is not just as a “provider of information”, but also determining the quality of the basic evidence through land status verification, tracing ownership history, checking document conformity, and confirming boundaries and plot sizes. Without this foundation, mediation is prone to degenerating into mere negotiation, which is easily disputed because the parties lack a common ground of fact. Therefore, the function of the National Land Agency (BPN) is also directly related to building trust. That is, when data is disclosed proportionally, evidentiary standards are applied consistently, and institutional stances are maintained neutrally, suspicion between parties can be reduced and the space for reaching a fair agreement becomes wider (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012). However, field findings confirm that the BPN's challenges are not only technical and

administrative, such as digitizing archives and integrating databases, but also structural, in the form of limited human resources and service capacity. In this situation, effective mediation requires a strategy of internal strengthening as well as external collaboration, so that the burden of verification does not rest on one institution, but is shared through an orderly, scheduled, and documented joint fact-checking mechanism (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

At the same time, notaries or land deed officers play a crucial role in transforming social agreements reached in mediation into legally binding and accountable documents during implementation. In many land conflict cases, the problem extends beyond conflicting interests, stemming from weak citizen documentation, irregular transaction histories, or incomplete administrative evidence that should serve as the basis for rights. This is where notaries or land deed officers serve as enforcers of administrative order, through checking completeness, drafting appropriate deeds, and affirming the rights and obligations of the parties in clear legal language. This role minimizes the likelihood of agreements being invalidated by unilateral interpretations and helps citizens understand the legal consequences of their chosen resolutions. Within a collaborative framework, document quality is crucial, which is arranged into a "lock" so that the mediation results do not stop as moral commitment, but rather an agreement that has certainty of content, deadlines, and implementation mechanisms, so that it is more resistant to repeated disputes (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012).

Furthermore, the Surabaya City Government plays a dual, complementary role. First, a substantive role by providing concrete and feasible resolution options, such as compensation schemes, humane relocation, or the provision of replacement housing within the region's capabilities. Second, a facilitative role as a process manager, ensuring that the dialogue is orderly, safe, and equitable, and does not degenerate into pressure on the weaker party. This capacity of the City Government makes it a liaison that unites the legal dimension (BPN and Notary or Land Deed Official), the social dimension (residents and vulnerable groups), and the economic dimension (parties interested in land use), so that the results...mediation is not only "documentarily appropriate," but also "implementable" and acceptable to citizens (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Thus, the biggest challenges for city governments typically lie in limited resources, the complexity of cross-regional coordination, and political dynamics that can disrupt consistent follow-up. Therefore, the success of multi-stakeholder mediation requires a clear division of burdens and responsibilities, a willingness to share data in an orderly manner, and a shared commitment to oversee implementation through to completion. In other words, the effectiveness of land mediation is not determined by a single, powerful actor, but by the ability to build collective capacity, namely when each institution consistently carries out its mandate, complements each other's shortcomings, and translates forum agreements into concrete actions on the ground (Emerson et al., 2012; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

Surabaya residents possess crucial social and historical capacity in resolving land conflicts, as they are the ones most familiar with the history of land ownership, actual boundaries on the ground, inheritance patterns, and the social dynamics underlying claims. This capacity is not only useful for enhancing evidence but also determines the legitimacy of mediation outcomes. An agreement that is "correct according to the documents" is still at risk of being rejected if it is not recognized as "fair according to the residents' experience" and is not addressing their basic needs for security of residence and a sense of security. Therefore, effective mediation must position residents as active subjects in problem formulation, evidence examination, decision-making, and implementation oversight, not simply as objects asked to accept decisions. Within a collaborative governance framework, meaningful engagement requires equal dialogue, open information exchange, and assurance that residents' voices truly influence decisions, ensuring that the process generates procedural justice while strengthening social acceptance of the outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2008). However, field findings also demonstrate residents' structural vulnerability due to limited legal literacy, weak ownership documents, and limited economic resources to navigate lengthy processes. These conditions create unequal bargaining positions when residents face actors with greater legal, political, and financial resources. Therefore, assistance from civil society organizations and academics becomes an empowerment strategy to bridge the information gap, strengthen residents' argumentative capacity, and ensure the process is fair and does not become a formality (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

At the stage of empowering collective action capacity, research results show that the effectiveness of mediation is determined by the parties' ability to integrate their dispersed capacities into coordinated collective work. The National Land Agency (BPN) has primary capacity in the form of land data, the authority to verify and confirm status, the legality of certificates, and the support of a technical team. However, this capacity is often

hampered by incomplete data, incomplete historical archives, and limited human resources, resulting in slow fact-checking processes and the risk of differing interpretations. Notaries or Land Deed Officials have the capacity to strengthen legal certainty through the preparation of deeds and strengthening administrative order, but face challenges when many residents lack valid documents or have disorganized transaction histories, requiring additional verification processes and intensive mentoring. The Surabaya City Government has the capacity to provide policy, financing, facilitate negotiation space, and program tools such as compensation or relocation, but is constrained by budget constraints, competing development priorities, and political dynamics that can affect the consistency of follow-up. On the other hand, residents contribute capacity in the form of field information, social testimony regarding tenure histories, community networks, and social legitimacy to agreements, but are weak in formal documentation and legal literacy. This diversity of capacities and constraints suggests that no single actor can resolve conflicts alone; what is needed is a collaborative working arrangement that integrates official data and field knowledge, combines administrative and social solutions, and secures agreements in a form that can be implemented and monitored (Emerson et al., 2012; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

Thus, the utilization of collective action capacity in land conflict mediation in Surabaya can be understood as a series of complementary activities that must be carried out simultaneously. The National Land Agency (BPN) provides the basis for legal certainty through data and status verification, Notaries or Land Deed Officials transform agreements into strong and orderly documents, the City Government ensures realistic resolution options and oversees implementation, and residents provide historical information and social acceptance that ensure the sustainability of the results. When these capacities are combined through an orderly, open, and equitable mechanism, mediation not only produces agreements on paper but also encourages fair, enforceable resolutions and reduces the likelihood of recurrent conflict. Conversely, if one of the key capacities is not connected or one of the actors does not consistently fulfill its role, the process can easily stall, agreements are weak, and implementation on the ground is prone to failure.

Finding 12 : There is a map of intersecting motivations across actors that can be stitched together into a collective goal: the community pursues legal certainty, justice, humane compensation/relocation, and meaningful participation; the city government is oriented towards social stability, smooth development, and participatory, non-litigation resolution; the National Land Agency (BPN) prioritizes legal certainty and data transparency. These three orientations are agreed upon as the basis “peaceful, transparent, fair, and win-win” so that disputes does not drag on and development receives public support.

Finding 13 : National Land Agency be an anchor shared motivation through mutual acceptance of official land data: the willingness of parties to recognize and use a single source of validated data is positioned as a way of building trust. This also reduces the perception of mediation as a one-sided interest. By mandating verification of status, ownership history, and certificate validity, the National Land Agency (BPN) links collaborative motivation to verifiable legal certainty.

Finding 14 : The City Government agrees on a shared motivation in its dual role: balancing public interests.– private sector and guarantor of social legitimacy of policies. The City Government's commitment to transparency, consistent follow-up, and resolution nonlitigation positioned as a condition for joint engagement; its strategic goal is to maintain social stability while ensuring that development does not harm citizens.

Finding 15 : The social license for agreements is built from the bottom up: society requires transparency, guarantees of fairness, and written assurances regarding the implementation of mediation outcomes; citizen trust grows when governments are neutral, companies are transparent, and there is independent third-party oversight. These conditions make shared motivation not just an intention, but a commitment that is monitored by the public and has the power to drive implementation.

4) The Process of Empowering Collective Action Capacity (Capacity for joint action)

Most researchers and practitioners would identify leadership as an important, if not the most important, element of collective capacity. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015:70) have introduced leadership initiation as a crucial driver of collaboration, but collaborative governance requires that leadership be strengthened and expanded to include many additional roles. In this way, leadership can be a significant outcome of collaborative dynamics, and particularly the capacity for collective action.

The utilization of collective action capacity in multi-actor mediation of land conflicts in Surabaya can be understood as the collective ability of the parties to transform understandings in the forum into actionable and accountable decisions. Within the framework of collaborative governance, collective action capacity does not emerge spontaneously, but is built through the combination of resources, authority, knowledge, working rules, and coordination mechanisms that enable the parties to act simultaneously in a directed manner. Therefore, the quality of mediation is not solely assessed by the smoothness of the meetings, but by the strength of the forum's institutional apparatus, role allocation, and resource support that enable dispute resolution to move from the problem clarification stage to the implementation stage of the results. This argument aligns with the emphasis that effective collaboration requires prerequisite initial conditions, institutional design, and process leadership capable of managing resource imbalances and encouraging tangible outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

From the perspective of the Surabaya City Government, the capacity for collective action is evident in its dual role as process leader and inter-stakeholder liaison. The city government not only facilitates meetings but also "enables policy" by providing administrative channels, formulating resolution options (e.g., site restructuring, compensation, or relocation), strengthening coordination across regional agencies, and ensuring follow-up to ensure agreements remain on paper. However, this capacity is vulnerable to weakening if implementation is not consistent or if budgetary and political support are inadequate. Within a collaborative governance framework, the ability of public actors to establish working rules, maintain process order, and ensure follow-up is a crucial part of the capacity for collective action, as it determines whether forum commitments are truly transformed into sequential and measurable actions (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012).

At the National Land Agency (BPN), collective action capacity rests on its function of supporting legal certainty through the provision and verification of land data, explanations of the status and history of rights, and technical support to ensure that forum decisions are based on legal grounds. In practice, BPN's challenges involve not only technical improvements such as archiving and updating data, but also structural constraints such as limited human resources and service burdens. Therefore, strengthening BPN's capacity in multi-actor mediation requires planned collaborative work, for example, by dividing verification tasks, standardizing evidentiary standards, and establishing an orderly data exchange mechanism. Within the logic of collaborative governance, BPN's position is crucial because without a recognized database, mediation can easily devolve into a dispute over claims, rather than a resolution (Emerson et al., 2012; Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Meanwhile, notaries or land titles (PPAT) strengthen collective action capacity by strengthening documents and providing formal legal certainty. This role is crucial because one of the weak points in land conflict mediation is the gap in document quality, particularly when residents lack complete formal evidence. Notaries or PPATs can bridge this gap by examining documents, drafting appropriate deeds, and translating forum agreements into legally binding forms. Thus, notaries or PPATs play a role in transforming social agreements into legal instruments that reduce the likelihood of recurring disputes and protect all parties from unilateral interpretations after the mediation process is complete. Within a collaborative framework, strengthening the "binding results" stage is part of collective action capacity, as it determines the enforceability of agreements (Emerson et al., 2012).

For citizens and NGOs, collective action capacity is primarily derived from historical and social knowledge about land tenure, community networks, and social legitimacy, which determine public acceptance of settlement outcomes. However, this capacity is often hampered by structural vulnerabilities such as low legal literacy, weak documentation, and limited funds to navigate lengthy dispute processes. This is where NGOs play a crucial role in strengthening citizen capacity through mentoring, providing information, ensuring procedural justice, and ensuring that vulnerable groups are not excluded from decision-making. In collaborative governance, empowering weaker groups is not merely an ethical issue but an institutional strategy to reduce power imbalances and strengthen the legitimacy of outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012).

Ultimately, these findings can be summarized as a causal chain: multi-actor mediation in Surabaya is effective when the capacities of each party are integrated into a clear division of roles and a well-organized work system: the city government ensures the process and follow-up, the National Land Agency (BPN) ensures the accuracy and validity of data, notaries or land titles (PPAT) ensure the validity of documents, residents provide field information and social legitimacy, and NGOs maintain support and oversight of the process. If any of these key capacities are disconnected (e.g., data cannot be verified, results are not legally binding, or residents are not accompanied), then the agreement risks ceasing to be a statement of intent. Therefore, collective action capacity is not the sum of the

capacities of individual actors, but rather the mediation system's ability to integrate resources, authority, and knowledge into collective action that can be tested, measured, and implemented (Emerson et al., 2012).

Overall, this confirms that the capacity for collective action in land conflict mediation is complementary: residents provide land history information, the City Government provides regulations and facilitation, the National Land Agency (BPN) ensures legal certainty, Notaries ensure formal legality, companies provide compensation, and NGOs maintain balance and justice. This integration of resources, authority, information, and trust is key to resolving land conflicts fairly, transparently, and sustainably. Resolving land conflicts in the current era of governance requires a government commitment to choose not competition but collaboration by enhancing cooperation between stakeholders. Governance emphasizes the principle of cooperation in the implementation of government affairs and services developed by several experts with the requirements of collaborative governance (Sink, 1998;

Fosler, 2002; Ansell & Gash, 2007) and partnership governance (Bovaird, 2004; Munro, 2008; Dwiyanto, 2012) in Zaenuri (2015:6). The governance model, with the concept of collaborative governance, is considered to be an alternative for accelerating public policy (Ansell & Gash, 2007) and is easier to foster community participation and partnerships between the pillars of governance.

Based on this, the collaboration undertaken is not solely for the sake of synergy and integration in the issuance of land certificates, but also for the early detection of potential land conflicts and their resolution. Good governance must be based on a process of collaboration and synergistic elaboration among stakeholders (Simanjuntak, 2017: 70).

Finding 16 : National Land Agency Acting as a collective capacity anchor through data validation, legalization of old documents, and guaranteeing follow-up on mediation results. This role links local citizen information, government facilitation, and the legal authority of notaries, ensuring that agreements are not merely moral commitments but rather have compelling force and real impact.

Finding 17 : Notaries/PPATs provide the legal backbone for executing mediation outcomes by verifying the validity of documents and creating authentic deeds. At the same time, they facilitate public legal literacy to ensure the substance of the agreement is understood, recognized, and minimizes the risk of further dispute.

Finding 18 : Collective action capacity is complementary: residents contribute social capital, local knowledge, and historical data on land tenure; the city government provides regulations and facilitation; the National Land Agency (BPN) ensures legal certainty; notaries/land officials (PPAT) ensure formal legality; companies provide compensation; and NGOs maintain a balance of power and procedural justice. Integration of resources, authority, information, and trust is key to ensuring fair, transparent, and sustainable resolution.

Thus, land conflict management policies in Surabaya need to formalize forum standards, establish integrated land data, strengthen binding results and follow-up, and provide a measurable public oversight mechanism so that mediation does not become an administrative ceremonial but rather a public policy instrument that truly resolves conflicts. Therefore, based on all the reviewed findings, **Minor proposition 1** This research is as follows: **If land conflict mediation in Surabaya is carried out in an equal and predictable forum, based on joint fact-finding with shared data, bound by firm legal instruments, and supported by collective motivation that has a social license through public participation and accountability, then the asymmetry of power and information will decrease, trust will be restored, and a valid, legitimate, technically feasible, and sustainable agreement can be realized; conversely, the absence of one of these elements tends to reduce mediation to a ritual without implementation.**

4.2. Factors Influencing Multi-Actor Mediation in Land Conflict Resolution in Surabaya City.

1) Trust Between Actors

Trust reduces transaction costs and promotes stability in interaction patterns, as well as facilitating innovation and knowledge exchange (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011). Trust enhances mutual understanding, defined as the ability to respect and understand another party's position, even when one party disagrees with the other. Mutual understanding allows actors to be more transparent with others, revealing their interests and motivations, which in turn improves communication and outcomes (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011).

Within the framework of collaborative governance, the four core dimensions emphasized by Ansell and Gash—face-to-face dialogue, trust-building, commitment to the process, and shared understanding—are best understood as a series of mutually reinforcing actions, not as stand-alone requirements. The sequence is gradual and cumulative: face-to-face dialogue creates a safe and equal communication space; from there, a minimum level of trust emerges, allowing parties to disclose previously withheld information; trust then fosters a commitment to persist through the long process; and consistent commitment allows for the formation of a shared understanding of the problem, evidence, and resolution options. When these four dimensions are consciously managed, the conflict arena shifts from a win-lose battle to a purposeful and accountable collaborative problem-solving process (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

In the context of land conflicts in Surabaya, interview findings confirm that trust between parties is the earliest foundation and determinant of the sustainability of multi-actor mediation processes. Trust does not exist as an abstract attitude, but is built through consistent actions from the pre-mediation stage, during negotiations, until after an agreement is reached. When the rules of the game are consistently applied, data is disclosed proportionally, meeting minutes are clear, and each step has a verifiable verification process, tensions are reduced and space for a fair resolution is opened up. This pattern aligns with Ansell and Gash's emphasis that face-to-face dialogue is only meaningful if it results in building trust that encourages parties to persist in the process and be willing to agree on a framework of reference for the disputed issues (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Field data also demonstrates that trust is built through a clear division of institutional roles. The Surabaya City National Land Agency emphasizes a trust strategy through transparency of relevant data, consistent application of regulations, and maintaining a neutral stance, thus strengthening its position as a guardian of legal certainty in the mediation process (Research Interview). The Surabaya City Government strengthens the trust ecosystem by acting as a neutral liaison, ensuring equal opportunity for discussion, preparing forum rules, and ensuring that agreements are followed up according to agreed timelines and standards (Research Interview). Notaries or Land Deed Officials (PPAT) complete this chain by ensuring agreements are written and enforceable, while also helping the community understand the legal consequences, thereby reducing suspicion and strengthening the evidentiary basis of mediation outcomes (Research Interview). Within this framework, the presence of community facilitators is also crucial to maintaining procedural fairness and ensuring that vulnerable groups are not excluded, ensuring that the dialogue is truly "authentic" and does not end in a pseudo-consultation (Innes & Booher, 1997; Arnstein, 1969; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003).

Thus, improving land conflict mediation in Surabaya needs to be positioned as strengthening a complete collaborative system: face-to-face dialogue must be designed to be equal, trust-building must be demonstrated through data transparency and consistent rules, commitment to the process must be measurable through clear work agreements and timelines, and shared understanding must be built through joint fact-finding that brings together field evidence, legal records, and local knowledge of residents. If these four dimensions are managed as a series, multi-actor mediation has a greater chance of producing agreements that are legally valid, socially acceptable, technically feasible, and sustainable in implementation (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

From the perspective of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), trust between actors is understood as a basic prerequisite that must be built, not assumed to already exist. In land conflicts, NGOs observe that relations between parties are often overshadowed by the history of the dispute, information gaps, and unequal bargaining power, so that mediation forums will only work if there are gradual steps to foster a sense of procedural security. Therefore, citizen assistance, information disclosure, and independent oversight are positioned as a series: assistance strengthens citizens' capacity to understand documents and legal consequences, transparency makes the process auditable, while independent oversight serves as a buffer to ensure that the rules are implemented consistently and are not diverted by the interests of more powerful actors. This pattern aligns with the idea that effective collaboration requires a process design that fosters trust through repeated interactions, transparency, and certainty of follow-up, not simply formal meetings (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2015). Within this framework, NGOs do not cease to be "defenders" of citizens, but rather serve as guardians of procedural justice, ensuring that all parties have an equal opportunity to speak, that evidence is openly examined, that minutes are recorded, and that agreements have mechanisms for monitoring their implementation. If governments and companies fail to consistently follow through on their commitments, trust collapses, and the forum loses its legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Tyler, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008).

For citizens, trust is not merely a psychological issue, but a practical requirement for their willingness to attend, speak, and accept outcomes. Citizens are more likely to participate when they observe three testable markers: the government acting neutrally as the process manager, the company being transparent about its plans, risks, and proposed compensation or redress schemes, and the presence of an independent monitor ensuring the process runs smoothly and that agreements do not "disappear" after the meeting. In other words, trust grows when citizens perceive a fair, predictable, and accountable process, as experiences of procedural injustice quickly trigger skepticism and a refusal to engage (Tyler, 2006; Arnstein, 1969). Therefore, failure to build trust can lead to mediation becoming a mere formality: citizens are reluctant to disclose information, reject settlement options, or choose alternative paths outside the forum. Conversely, when trust is nurtured through transparency, equal treatment, and oversight of implementation, multi-actor mediation is more likely to produce solutions that are acceptable to the community and are sustainable in practice (Emerson et al., 2015; Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Research data shows that inter-stakeholder trust is both a fundamental foundation and an absolute prerequisite for the success of multi-actor mediation in resolving land conflicts in Surabaya. Within the framework of collaborative governance, trust is not understood as "pre-existing social capital," but rather as the result of a process designed intentionally through repeated meetings, open information, certainty about rules, and consistent follow-up (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2015). Because land disputes always involve information gaps and imbalances in bargaining power, mediation forums will only be productive when the parties perceive procedural justice: the process is perceived as fair, their voices are heard, evidence is fairly examined, and decisions are treated consistently (Tyler, 2006). Trust thus acts as a "support for forum rationality": it reduces defensiveness, opens up space for data sharing, and allows negotiations to move from mutual claims to shared problem-solving (Innes & Booher, 2010).

Systematically, trust-building in the Surabaya case took place across stages, from the pre-mediation stage, through the negotiation stage, to the agreement implementation stage. In the pre-mediation stage, the Surabaya City National Land Agency played a role as a provider of legal certainty through open access to relevant data, consistent application of regulations, and an impartial attitude. This practice is important because land disputes often begin with data discrepancies, incomplete documents, or inconsistent interpretations. Therefore, data transparency and verification standards are the first steps to reducing suspicion and narrowing the scope for factual disputes (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2015). At the same time, the Surabaya City Government strengthened the trust ecosystem by acting as a neutral liaison, ensuring equal space for discussion, establishing forum rules, and providing assurance that the agreements reached would be followed up through policy instruments and coordination between regional agencies. This pattern is in line with the view that successful collaboration requires facilitative leadership that is able to maintain balance in relations, prevent the domination of strong actors, and maintain the credibility of the process (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Thus, trust between actors is not merely a supporting element, but a core prerequisite that determines whether multi-actor mediation has public acceptance, enforceability, and a sense of justifiable justice. In land disputes fraught with information gaps and differences in bargaining power, trust serves as a "process guarantee": it encourages parties to be willing to attend, disclose data, examine evidence impartially, and accept decisions as the result of fair deliberation, not as a unilateral victory. Therefore, when trust is low, mediation can easily degenerate into ceremonial meetings that revolve around claims, become bogged down by suspicion, and ultimately lose social legitimacy, making the resulting agreements fragile and difficult to implement. In line with the collaborative governance model, the quality of collaboration is built through a mutually reinforcing series of elements: face-to-face dialogue, trust-building, commitment to the process, and shared understanding (Ansell & Gash, 2008). In a more integrative framework, these elements need to be translated into concrete arrangements, such as forum rules that guarantee equality of voice, joint fact-finding based on verifiable data, binding agreements in clear written form, and implementation monitoring mechanisms so that decisions do not remain on paper (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2015; Innes & Booher, 2010). Furthermore, from a procedural justice perspective, citizen acceptance and actor compliance with mediation outcomes will increase when the process is perceived as fair, neutral, and consistent (Tyler, 2006). Building on this foundation, the following section presents research findings that demonstrate how trust in Surabaya is built through rules of the game and data transparency, tested when interests clash, and operationalized through monitoring the implementation of agreements in land conflict resolution.

- Finding 19** : Trust is seen as the foundation of dispute resolution; it is built through three mutually reinforcing pillars: the neutrality of the government's role as a bridge builder, transparency and equal space for dialogue, and consistent follow-up of policies and agreements. All three provide a sense of security for citizens and process certainty for businesses.
- Finding 20** : The National Land Agency (BPN) positions itself as a guardian of legal certainty with its primary strategy of providing access to official land data, maintaining consistent regulatory implementation, and demonstrating impartiality. Joint recognition of a single, verified data source has been shown to reduce suspicion and narrow the scope for factual disputes..
- Finding 21** : NGOs view trust as social capital that must be developed gradually through citizen support, information transparency, regular meetings, and independent oversight by third parties such as academics. These mechanisms serve as safeguards for procedural justice and prevent the dominance of powerful actors..
- Finding 22** : From a citizen perspective, trust is conditional. Governments must be neutral, companies transparent about plans and compensation, and independent oversight available. Without these three conditions, participation tends to be low due to the memory of failed promises and protracted processes.

2) Distribution of Power

Discussions on the distribution of power begin with the understanding that power is not simply about “who holds office,” but also about who is able to influence decisions, set agendas, control information, and shape how issues are perceived. Within the pluralist tradition, Dahl (1961) demonstrated that power in city governance tends to be distributed among various competing and negotiating interest groups, resulting in policies emerging from a tug-of-war of influence, rather than from a single center of control. However, this approach needs to be complemented by a relational perspective that emphasizes that power also operates through social relations, knowledge, and discourse; power does not stem solely from formal authority but is present in everyday practices, the way information is managed, and the way truth is “established” in the public sphere (Foucault, 1980). Therefore, in land conflict mediation, the distribution of power must be read as a combination of formal power (regulatory authority, certification, permits, administrative decisions) and informal power (socio-political networks, community support, influence of public opinion, and the ability to mobilize resources). This framework aligns with collaborative governance studies that position power and resource imbalances as initial conditions that can hinder collaborative work if not managed through equitable institutional design and structured processes (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2015).

In the context of land conflict mediation, the distribution of power is crucial because it influences three crucial points. First, who determines the problem definition and the factual framework, such as land plot data, land rights history, measurement maps, and administrative evidence used as references. Second, who is able to transform understandings into enforceable decisions, as not all parties have the authority to bind mediation results to legal and administrative instruments. Third, who is able to influence social acceptance through community support, moral legitimacy, or public opinion pressure. If these three points are unequally controlled by certain parties, mediation risks becoming a process that only appears participatory but actually produces biased decisions, making them easily rejected, challenged, or unimplemented. This is where it is important to view power not only as the ability to “coerce,” but also as the ability to “shape choices” and “limit alternatives” in the decision-making process (Lukes, 2005).

From an institutional perspective, the National Land Agency (BNPB) possesses strong formal power because it is authorized to provide, examine, and verify land data, which serves as the basis for legal certainty. In mediation, this power can serve as a balancing force if exercised through data transparency, equal audit standards for all parties, and impartiality, thereby narrowing the scope for factual disputes and reducing the opportunity for information manipulation. However, data-based power can also be a source of inequality if access to and understanding of data is unequal. Therefore, managing the distribution of power requires that data not only be made public but also be understood collectively through explanations accessible to citizens, transparent audit schedules, and correction mechanisms for errors or new evidence. This principle aligns with the notion that collaborative governance requires regulating processes to minimize the opportunity for dominance by more powerful actors, particularly in complex issues fraught with economic interests (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2015).

Building on resource dependency theory, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) explain that organizations are never truly independent because they always require resources from the environment, such as information, authority, political support, budgets, and access to services. This dependency results in power relations: those who control strategic resources tend to have greater influence in determining the direction of processes, rules of the game, and decision outcomes. Within this framework, collaboration is understood as a rational strategy to reduce uncertainty and manage dependencies so that each party can gain certainty, reduce risk, and cover each other's capacity gaps (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This explanation aligns with the logic of collaborative governance, which emphasizes that the success of joint work is strongly influenced by the relative balance of power and resources, as unchecked inequalities will weaken legitimacy and reduce the willingness of the weaker party to persist in the process (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2015).

From a game theory perspective, cooperation between parties can be understood as a strategic interaction involving the choice of "staying in the forum" or "going it alone" to pursue their respective interests. When the distribution of power is unequal, dominant parties have an incentive to shape the rules of the game to their advantage, while weaker parties tend to be suspicious, defensive, and seek protection through channels outside the forum. Therefore, multi-party mediation will only be effective if the rules of the game are made fair and verifiable, so that the costs of domination are high and the benefits of cooperation are more reasonable for all parties. At the level of network governance, Provan and Kenis (2008) show that cooperative networks can be managed in several ways, for example, centralized by a single leading organization, managed jointly by members, or managed by a neutral intermediary institution. In land conflicts, the choice of this management form is largely determined by the level of power imbalance and the need for neutrality. The higher the potential for domination, the more important it is to have a neutral process manager and oversight mechanisms to maintain process equity (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Ansell & Gash, 2008).

In the context of land conflict mediation in Surabaya, research data demonstrates that the distribution of power is a key issue underlying the need for multi-stakeholder mediation. This imbalance is particularly evident in the differences in control over resources: business actors generally possess capital, access to legal aid, networks of influence, and the ability to manage administrative processes, while citizens are often limited by local knowledge, incomplete documentation, and the economic resilience to navigate lengthy processes. This imbalance explains why conflicts can easily escalate and why resolving them cannot simply rely on formal channels. The issue at stake is not simply "right or wrong" according to documents, but also citizens' access to a fair process that can restore a sense of security. It is at this point that collaborative design needs to incorporate countervailing devices to prevent the distribution of power from devolving into domination, but rather into a functional division of roles (Emerson et al., 2015; Tyler, 2006).

The role of each actor in mediation is crucial precisely because each brings different resources to bear on the balance. The National Land Agency contributes to reducing inequality through data transparency, standardized verification methods, and consistent application of regulations, preventing powerful parties from monopolizing the interpretation of facts and allowing citizens to have a more equal opportunity to verify claims through official data. The City Government acts as a balancing force by ensuring inclusive forums, providing clear rules, ensuring equal opportunity for discussion, and overseeing the follow-up of agreements to ensure they remain on paper. Notaries or Land Deed Officials strengthen the certainty of outcomes through accurate document preparation, easy-to-understand explanations, and impartiality, ensuring that mediation outcomes are accountable and not easily disputed. Non-governmental organizations and academics strengthen citizen capacity through mentoring, increasing understanding, compiling evidence, and monitoring the process, thereby correcting imbalances in bargaining power and protecting vulnerable groups. With this division of roles, the distribution of power is not eliminated, but is managed to make the process fairer, more acceptable, and more likely to be implemented (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2015; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Tyler, 2006).

The analytical implication is that a balance of power tends to foster inclusive and sustainable collaboration because the weaker parties perceive the process as fair and the stronger parties as secure. Conversely, unmanaged power imbalances can potentially result in superficial cooperation: forums operate, but the direction and outcomes are still determined by the dominant party, leading citizens to lose trust, reject the outcomes, or shift the conflict to another arena. Therefore, an adaptive distribution of power needs to be supported by auditable tools, such as data transparency, forum rules that protect vulnerable parties, clear representative mandates, and implementation

oversight. With these mechanisms, multi-party mediation has the potential to produce fair, acceptable, legally sound, and sustainable agreements because it not only brings the parties together in one room but also restructures the power relations that have been the source of conflict (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2015; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

Finding 23 : The architecture of power is asymmetrical: the dominant formal legal authority lies with the BPN and the City Government, while citizens hold the power. social license and moral legitimacy based on historical control over land. This imbalance affects agenda setting, the rhythm of negotiations, and the opportunities for each actor to become a veto player.

Finding 24 : Power is distributed across two intertwined arenas: the formal arena (regulation, licensing, certification, and legal products) and the informal arena (political networks, public opinion, and community support). The shift in strategies between arenas (shopping venue) often occurs and determines the direction and intensity of the conflict.

Finding 25 : The City Government functions as a balancer of public interests–private sector, but its effectiveness is determined by the ability to maintain neutrality, consistent follow-up, and coordination across regional agencies. When the balancing function is strong, conflict escalation decreases; when it is weak, the dominance of powerful actors increases.

Finding 26 : Notaries/PPATs have a "small but decisive" influence as legal gatekeepers; the quality of verification and deed formatting can be either a key factor or a loophole for future disputes. In other words, the technical and ethical capacity of Notaries/PPATs significantly influences the distribution of proceeds.

3) Commitment to Following the Mediation Process

Commitment to the process determines whether land conflict mediation results in a real resolution or remains a ceremonial meeting. In collaborative governance, commitment is not just about attending meetings, but also about a willingness to adhere to agreed-upon rules, be open to exchanging information, refrain from unilateral actions outside the forum, and consistently complete follow-up actions through to the implementation stage. Ansell and Gash position commitment as a crucial link connecting dialogue, building trust, and establishing shared understanding, allowing the collaborative process to move from debating claims to joint problem-solving (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Similarly, the dynamic collaboration framework emphasizes that commitment is part of the internal driving force of collaboration, which must be continuously maintained through clear rules, adequate capacity, and oversight of implementation, so that agreements are not easily withdrawn when political, economic, or conflicting pressures arise (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2015).

In the Surabaya field findings, commitment is interpreted by the perpetrator as a willingness to “bind oneself” to a measurable process. This is particularly true through the establishment of roles, decision-making authority, work schedules, standards of proof, and deadlines for implementation of the agreements. The National Land Agency plays a role in maintaining commitment through consistent application of land regulations, providing access to relevant information, and confirming administrative follow-up steps that can be taken after an agreement is reached. The Surabaya City Government strengthens this commitment by facilitating forum procedures, ensuring equal space for discussion, and acting as a driving force. coordination across regional devices so that the mediation results are not "disconnected" in the decision stage, but rather progresses to actions such as administrative arrangements, service support, or the provision of viable resolution options. At this point, commitment serves as a legitimacy support for the process because the public will judge success not by the number of meetings, but by the timely and fair fulfillment of promises of implementation; this aligns with the procedural justice view that public acceptance increases when the process is perceived as consistent, impartial, and accountable (Tyler, 2006).

Commitment must also be reinforced through instruments that provide certainty of implementation. Notaries or Land Deed Officials are key because they help translate social agreements into clear, complete, and enforceable documents, including those outlining the parties' obligations, action sequences, deadlines, and consequences for violations. With strong documentation, the parties feel more secure because the agreement rests not only on good faith but also on a basis that can be tested and acted upon. From the perspective of non-governmental organizations, commitment is a measure of mediation's credibility: when more powerful actors use mediation as a means of delaying or procrastinating, community trust easily erodes. Therefore, non-governmental organizations emphasize the importance of written agreements, transparency of information, community support, and monitoring

implementation through simple indicators such as adherence to schedules, progress on administrative follow-up, realization of compensation or relocation, and the availability of complaint channels for deviations. With this framework, commitment is no longer understood as a mere moral stance, but rather as an institutional discipline that ensures mediation remains legitimate, accepted by the community, and sustainable in its implementation (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2015).

Commitment can be understood as the "driving force" that distinguishing mediation from a real settlement or merely a ceremonial meeting. Conceptually, mediation is a process where a neutral third party helps the parties develop conflict resolution steps and formulate a workable agreement (Liebmann, 2000). However, in high-value land conflicts, the goal of mediation does not stop at "peace at the negotiating table", but also to clarify expectations, improve cooperative relationships between parties, and close the gap of misunderstandings that often trigger recurring conflicts (Cloke & Goldsmith, 2000). Therefore, commitment needs to be read as a collective willingness to complete the process to the implementation stage, not just attendance at meetings.

Within the framework of collaborative governance, commitment to the process is a prerequisite for dialogue, trust, and shared understanding to grow into actionable decisions. Ansell and Gash emphasize that collaboration works as a series of mutually reinforcing elements, from face-to-face dialogue, trust-building, commitment to the process, to shared understanding; if any of these elements weakens, the quality of the collaborative outcome also weakens. Similarly, Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh position commitment as part of the "shared energy" that keeps cross-actor cooperation going. When there are conflicting interests, power imbalances, and the risk of deadlock, commitment serves as a guarantee of continuity: parties are willing to share data, accept evidence, correct claims, and stay on track with the agreement, even if the process is long and not always comfortable.

Operationally (as the research actions and field practices you describe), strong commitments must be made concrete, and can be checked, not left as a simple "good faith" denied. For legal practitioners, commitment is most effective when it is expressed in a clear written document (e.g., a mediation agreement, an authentic deed, or a peace agreement, depending on the chosen route), containing the roles and mandates of the representatives, work stages, deadlines, success indicators, and gradual consequences in the event of violations. This logic is important because in land conflicts, the main issue is often not just "what is agreed", but "who is required to do what, when, and how to prove it". From a citizen perspective, commitment is a visible measure of fairness: citizens judge mediation as legitimate and credible when outcomes actually occur on the ground (e.g., compensation payments, humane relocation, or agreed-upon boundary realignments). When implementation gaps occur, public trust declines, participation weakens, and mediation is perceived as a formality. The procedural justice framework also emphasizes that public compliance and acceptance increase when the process is perceived as neutral, consistent, provides a voice, and treats all parties with respect; therefore, the government's commitment to overseeing implementation is a key determinant of the outcome's legitimacy.

Thus, the discussion on commitment in multi-actor mediation in Surabaya should be emphasized as follows: moral commitment (willingness to negotiate honestly and openly) must go hand in hand with institutional commitment (process rules, role allocation, data security, and follow-up monitoring) and legal commitment (binding document form). All three make mediation more effective. quickly move from "agreements in forums" to "real change on the ground", while avoiding stalling strategies, rival forums, or unilateral interpretations after an agreement has been made.

Conflict mediation is a dispute resolution approach that involves a neutral third party assisting the parties in building understanding, formulating resolution options, and reaching agreement without coercion. Within Johan Galtung's framework, mediation does not stop at "ending the argument", but must target the root of the problem that caused it. recurring conflicts, including direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence, so that what results is not merely negative peace (the absence of violence), but positive peace that is just and sustainable (Galtung, 1969, 1996). Therefore, strong mediation should be understood as a process of conflict transformation, namely changing patterns of relationships, structures of injustice, and perspectives that legitimize inequality, so that the results not only reduce tensions momentarily, but also improve the conditions that give rise to conflict (Borah, 2024; Drago, 2023).

In practice, mediation works through fair and inclusive facilitated negotiations, with the mediator's primary task being to create a safe, orderly, and constructive dialogue space, allowing each party to express their interests, needs, and concerns equally. Mediation literature emphasizes that the success of the process is greatly influenced

by the ability to manage inter-party relationships, organize communication, and maintain procedural fairness, ensuring that parties feel heard and respected, and are willing to reexamine their initial positions to find workable common ground (Brummans et al., 2022). Furthermore, a cross-sector partnership approach suggests that mediation will be more effective when supported by collaborative work between institutions, as preventing escalation and post-conflict recovery require consistent role allocation, information exchange, and monitoring of agreement implementation (Stewart et al., 2021). Thus, mediation is not just a “peace meeting”, but rather a dispute resolution governance plan that links dialogue, evidence, agreement, and implementation, so that the agreement has social legitimacy as well as implementation resilience.

In the context of this research, understanding Galtung's three dimensions of violence is key to explaining why land conflicts in Surabaya cannot be handled solely through formal legal evidence. Direct violence is evident in evictions, intimidation, or open clashes on the ground. Structural violence manifests itself in unequal access to documents, land information, legal aid, and limited bargaining power for residents when dealing with actors with more capital and powerful networks. Cultural violence operates through perspectives and social justifications that normalize residents' marginalization, for example when claims of "development" are understood as a justification for ignoring the right to life and historical control. Because these three dimensions are intertwined, effective mediation must be directed at conflict transformation, namely improving relationships, closing gaps in structural injustice, and changing institutional mechanisms to prevent agreements from easily reverting to new conflicts (Galtung, 1969, 1996; Brummans et al., 2022; Stewart et al., 2021).

Within this framework, mediators and mediation organizers are no longer simply "peacemakers" but also need to facilitate changes to the rules, procedures, and customs that have underpinned the conflict. In Surabaya, these changes primarily involve opening up access to verifiable land information, establishing a common ground through joint fact-finding, and ensuring procedural fairness so that weaker parties are not marginalized by the dominance of stronger parties. Mediation literature emphasizes the importance of a safe, orderly, and equal dialogue space so that parties can reveal their true interests and needs, rather than simply defend their positions, thus making resolution options more realistic and feasible (Brummans et al., 2022). At the same time, mediation supported by cross-sector partnerships is also better able to prevent escalation, as implementing agreements requires role allocation, data exchange, and joint monitoring after negotiations are completed (Stewart et al., 2021).

This argument aligns with the notion of collaborative governance, which positions face-to-face dialogue, trust-building, commitment to the process, and shared understanding as a mutually reinforcing chain, not as stand-alone elements. In land conflicts, trust-building cannot be normatively demanded but must be demonstrated through visible and verifiable actions, such as consistent rules, data transparency, and timely follow-up to agreements. Commitment to the process must be outlined in clear rules of the game, including the mandate of authorized representatives, work schedules, procedures for examining evidence, and consequences for violations. Shared understanding is then built through a shared definition of the problem and agreement on the facts of the case, allowing negotiations to move from debating claims to assessing settlement options that can be compared based on criteria of fairness, legal certainty, technical feasibility, cost, and time (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2015).

In this study, the emphasis on structural and cultural changes that underpin conflict can also be explained through Structuration Theory. Structure not only constrains action but also enables it, through the rules and resources used by actors. When forum rules, evidentiary standards, joint fact-finding mechanisms, and binding mediation outcomes are consistently implemented, actors begin to reorganize their behavior from “withholding information” to “openly examining evidence.” This repeated practice then strengthens the mediation structure itself, making the process more predictable, procedurally fairer, and more powerful in encouraging agreement implementation. In other words, institutionalized mediation transforms conflict from an unequal relationship into collaborative work based on clear rules and accessible information resources, thereby minimizing the risk of domination, data manipulation, and breach of agreement (Giddens, 1984; Emerson et al., 2015).

Based on all of the above, the benefits of mediation in the context of the Surabaya land conflict primarily lie in its ability to reduce the social costs of the conflict, accelerate clarity in resolution steps, and prevent further deterioration of inter-party relations due to prolonged fighting. However, these benefits only emerge if mediation is structured as a comprehensive policy process, providing a space for equal dialogue, establishing a common ground of facts, binding outcomes in enforceable documents, and overseeing implementation through joint monitoring. Without these prerequisites, mediation is vulnerable to becoming a formality that produces documents but does not

produce real change on the ground. Therefore, the findings of this study reinforce the theoretical position that multi-actor mediation in land conflicts must be understood as a collaborative governance mechanism oriented toward conflict transformation, not simply an alternative to the judicial process (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Galtung, 1996; Brummans et al., 2022; Stewart et al., 2021; Emerson et al., 2015).

The advantages of mediation in this study lie primarily in its ability to build more acceptable agreements, reduce escalation, and open up a wider range of settlement options than the win-lose approach in court, particularly when the parties' relationship will continue within the same urban space (Saundry et al., 2013). However, these benefits only emerge if the mediator possesses adequate skills and the process is rigorously designed. Mediation literature emphasizes the importance of active listening skills, accurate summarization, reframing heated statements into discussable issues, managing emotions and tensions, maintaining necessary confidentiality, and ensuring all parties understand the procedures and consequences of settlement options (Moore, 2014). In land conflicts, these skills must be combined with careful management of evidence and documents, as the primary problem is often not simply a lack of agreement but also a lack of facts due to differences in data, ownership history, and incomplete documents. Therefore, effective mediation in the context of this study tends to be a measured combination: facilitation to ensure equality of deliberation, assessment to ensure clarity of risks and certainty of binding outcomes, and orientation toward relationship change to restore trust and social acceptance. This series aligns with the needs of your dissertation research, which positions multi-actor mediation as a policy mechanism that not only resolves disputes but also reorganizes social relations, ensures certainty of land administration, and ensures the sustainability of agreement implementation.

Regarding the factors—The factors underlying Multi-Actor Mediation in Land Conflict Resolution in Surabaya City, including commitment to participate in the mediation process, can be concluded as follows: Commitment is a determining factor in the success of land conflict mediation. All actors including the National Land Agency (BPN), Notaries/PPAT, City Government, NGOs, legal practitioners, and the community emphasized that without commitment, mediation will only be a formality that does not resolve the conflict substantively. The BPN emphasizes commitment through legal instruments, ongoing communication, and enforcement of regulations. Notaries/PPAT see that commitment must be strengthened by legal force through a deed or a binding written agreement. The Surabaya City Government interprets commitment as openness, willingness to compromise, and supervision of implementation, with a strategic role as policy enabler and facilitators. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) highlighting commitment as a factor of credibility and legitimacy, emphasizing written mechanisms, post-mediation monitoring, and vigilance against dominant actors who often treat mediation as a formality. Legal practitioners emphasize that commitment must be supported by binding legal documents so that agreements are not only moral but also have legal consequences. Communities view commitment as a concrete realization of mediation results on the ground (e.g., compensation or land restructuring), and demand that the government play a role in ensuring that these outcomes do not recur. implementation gap.

Overall, commitment is seen not only as a matter of presence, but also as a matter of sincerity, transparency, concrete implementation, and reinforcement through legal instruments and oversight mechanisms. With a strong moral and legal commitment from all parties, multi-actor mediation can be a just, legitimate, effective, and sustainable solution to land conflict resolution.

- Finding 27** : Commitment is practiced through pre-mediation agreement which includes ground rules, schedules, data exchange standards, and confidentiality. This initial document has been shown to reduce procedural ambiguity, improve attendance discipline, and accelerate issue convergence.
- Finding 28** : The success of the forum depends on the delegation of authorized representatives to make decisions. The absence of decision-makers at crucial moments results in looping meetings, prolonging the process, and reducing trust between parties.
- Finding 29** : Commitment is tested at three points: willingness to share relevant data, cessation of parallel maneuvers outside the forum (litigation/administrative without notice), and compliance with milestone Agreement execution. Compliance with these three points is correlated with a decrease in post-mediation dispute escalation.
- Finding 30** : Binding mediation results into a clear legal instrument (authentic deed), licensing addendum, or administrative decision increases enforceability and reduces the risk of rollback. Government support for post-mediation administrative services accelerates implementation on the ground.

Finding 31 : Post-mediation commitments are maintained through a joint monitoring mechanism: performance indicators, deadlines, an implementation tracker, and a public complaints channel. A graduated incentive-sanction scheme encourages compliance while providing a corrective path if technical or social obstacles arise.

From all the findings of this research, **Minor Proposition 2** What can be built from this research is: "*If land conflict mediation in Surabaya is carried out with three pillars fulfilled: trust between parties, managed distribution of power, and measurable process commitment through government neutrality, transparency of BPN data, clear legal binding, and public participation and oversight, then mediation will produce a legitimate, socially acceptable, enforceable, and sustainable agreement. If one of these pillars is absent, mediation tends to turn into an administrative ritual without tangible results.*"

Based on the minor proposition, then Major proposition is : If mediation for land conflict resolution in Surabaya is institutionalized collaboratively through an equal forum, shared facts based on integrated data, legal certainty, and public accountability, then trust can grow, power can be well-managed, commitment to the process is maintained, and agreements can be legitimate, enforceable, and sustainable. Conversely, without institutionalization, mediation tends to become an administrative ritual without tangible results.

5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

5.1. Conclusion

- 1) Collaboration of the Parties in Handling Land Conflicts with a Multi-Actor Mediation Approach in the City of Surabaya runs as a series of mutually reinforcing processes: starting from reading the context (power imbalance, ownership history, and administrative overlap), followed by equal and transparent face-to-face meetings, the formation of a shared fact-base (joint fact-finding) which reduces information asymmetry, to binding the results in legal instruments to be enforceable. In the role architecture, the City Government acts as bridge builder which ensures equal dialogue space and consistent follow-up; the National Land Agency (BPN) strengthens legal certainty through data integrity and transparency; while NGOs maintain procedural justice and accountability, and ensure the meaningful involvement of vulnerable groups. With this design, the mediation forum does not stop at consensus, but is transformed into decisions with administrative coercive power and a joint monitoring mechanism. This practice is consistent with the research focus that places principled engagement—shared motivation—capacity for joint action as a collaborative work sequence to transform understanding into measurable execution.
- 2) The factors underlying the success of multi-actor mediation are summarized in three main levers. First, trust between actors as a prerequisite for legitimacy is built through government neutrality, openness of official land data by the National Land Agency (BPN), neutrality and legal literacy by Notaries/PPATs, and independent oversight by civil society. From the citizens' perspective, this trust is conditional on transparency, fair compensation/relocation, and third-party oversight. Second, the managed distribution of power—the imbalance of power between corporations/formal authority holders and socially licensed communities—must be balanced through equal access to information, correction of dominance, and cross-institutional coordination so that the formal arena (regulation, certification) does not negate the informal arena (community support, public opinion). Third, commitment to the process is operationalized through pre-mediation agreements, data exchange standards, delegation of decision-making authority, cessation of parallel maneuvers outside the forum, and binding outcomes in deeds/administrative decisions accompanied by monitoring mechanisms, deadlines, and sanctions and incentives. These three factors, which stem from field constraints such as invalid data, sectoral egos, and low legal literacy, explain why well-designed mediation is able to reduce escalation and accelerate the realization of agreements in the field.

5.2. Suggestion

Based on the results of research on Collaboration in Handling Land Conflicts with a Multi-Actor Mediation Approach in the City of Surabaya, the following suggestions can be given:

- 1) Strengthening the Land Administration System

The Surabaya City Government, along with the National Land Agency (BPN), needs to accelerate the integration of digital land data that is accurate, transparent, and easily accessible to the public. Audits and synchronization of legacy documents with the new system are urgently needed to reduce administrative overlap. Furthermore, human resource development in the fields of law, information technology, and conflict management is essential.

2) Building Trust Between Actors

Trust is the main foundation of multi-actor mediation. The National Land Agency (BPN), Notaries/PPAT (Land Deed Officials), and the City Government must maintain neutrality, data transparency, and policy consistency. NGOs and academics need to strengthen their roles as independent parties capable of providing assistance, education, and oversight. Meanwhile, the community must be involved from the beginning of the mediation process to foster a sense of ownership.sense of ownership).

3) Balancing the Distribution of Power

The disparity between developers with significant capital and communities with limited resources needs to be addressed through regulations that balance interests. Community empowerment must be achieved through legal literacy, NGO support, and strengthening negotiation capacity. Compensation, relocation, and CSR mechanisms from developers must be designed in a transparent, participatory, and fair manner.

4) Strengthening Commitment in the Mediation Process

All parties need to affirm their commitment not only through their presence but also through a legally binding written agreement. The City Government can establish a permanent mediation forum (conflict resolution task force) to ensure the sustainability of the agreement. Regular monitoring and evaluation are mandatory to ensure that the mediation results are not just documented but are actually implemented on the ground.

5) Utilizing Collective Action Capacity

The effectiveness of mediation depends heavily on leveraging collective action capacity. The Surabaya City Government needs to optimize its role as a facilitator. policy enabler, and bridge builder to maintain the continuity of collaboration, the National Land Agency (BPN) must ensure legal certainty through land data validation and legalization of old documents. Notaries/PPATs need to improve legal literacy among the public, while residents must strengthen community organizing to enable active participation. NGOs and academics can play a role in strengthening the community's bargaining position while ensuring procedural fairness.

5.3. Research Implications

1) Theoretical / Novelty

This dissertation emphasizes the fundamental shift from ad hoc mediation processes to institutionalized mediation as a prerequisite for effective land conflict resolution in high-land-value cities. collaboration dynamics which emphasizes dignified engagement, collective trust, and the capacity for joint action, the effectiveness of collaboration is not determined by the quality of dialogue alone, but by four pillars that must be present simultaneously, namely an equal and predictable forum, shared facts based on integrated land data, clear legal binding, and continuous public accountability (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015). The next novelty is the integration of three execution safeguards in the form of shared data, legal binding, and public accountability which empirically reduce information asymmetry, manage power imbalances, and maintain compliance after mediation. With this tool, agreements do not stop as moral commitments, but are transformed into decisions that can be executed and their progress monitored through accountable governance and a clear implementation framework (Susskind & Rumore, 2015; Karl, Susskind, & Wallace, 2007; Bovens, 2007; Bovens, Goodin, & Schillemans, 2014; O'Toole, 2000).

This contribution is reinforced by the operationalization of Structuration Theory. Rules and resources that were previously floating in practice are transformed into an institutional architecture that binds actors' behavior. Forum and pre-mediation rules serve as modalities of legitimacy that guide action; a shared land database, including verification of status, history, and spatial aspects, acts as an allocative resource that reduces factual disputes and strengthens significance through shared meaning of the data; while the administrative authority of the city government and the National Land Agency (BPN) to bind results in authentic deeds, licensing addenda, or state administrative decisions becomes an authoritative resource that bridges understanding into action, in line with the modality of domination (Giddens, 1984; Stones, 2005; Orlikowski, 2000). Thus, the duality of structure is operationally present: the institutional structure of mediation not only constrains but also enables action; the actions of actors who adhere to procedures, share data, and adhere to deadlines in turn reproduce and reinforce effective mediation structures through the routinization of forums, reflective monitoring, and the use of information systems that overcome spatial and temporal distances (Giddens, 1984; Orlikowski, 2000).

Another innovation lies in the restructuring of the distribution of power into a functional role configuration. The city government acts as a balancer and liaison, the National Land Agency (BPN) as a buffer for legal certainty based on official data, Notaries or PPATs as guardians of document quality and binding power, and NGOs and citizens as pillars of accountability and social acceptance. This shift shifts the debate from “who is in power” towards “how power is managed so that it is fair and can be executed,” while reducing the tendency shopping venue between formal and informal arenas that often delay or deflect resolution (Pralle, 2003; Suchman, 1995). In the Indonesian context, strengthening institutional pillars and shared data is also relevant to the plurality of rights regimes that often create tensions between legal and historical claims, making certainty of land administration, certification standards, and integration of spatial information crucial prerequisites (Bedner, 2016; Lucas, Warren, & Syahrudin, 2013; Williamson, Enemark, Wallace, & Rajabifard, 2010).

The entire framework above is reinforced with upstream performance indicators.—Downstream indicators include forum discipline, the quality and integrity of shared data, the clarity of binding documents, deadline compliance, the quality of compensation or relocation, implementation tracking, and public complaint channels. This set of indicators transforms mediation from an administrative rite into a policy mechanism that can be openly monitored, corrected, and accounted for, while maintaining the social legitimacy of the agreement (Bovens, 2007; Bovens et al., 2014; Fung, 2006). Synthesized into propositions that are simultaneously necessary and sufficient, this research confirms that strengthening one or two pillars alone is insufficient. Effectiveness demands that the four pillars of institutionalization and the three safeguards of execution work in unison so that consensus is transformed into actions that are legally valid, socially acceptable, technically feasible, and sustainable in the context of cities with land scarcity and tensions between legal and historical rights (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bedner, 2016; Williamson et al., 2010).

2) Practical

a. Strengthening the Land Administration System

City Government & BPN: Immediately build an integrated digital land information system based on one map policy. To prevent overlapping land data, the government will conduct a follow-up audit of old ownership documents and synchronize them with the new system. Human resources will be strengthened by providing training for BPN employees, Surabaya city government officials, and village/sub-district officials in land law, digital technology, and conflict mediation.

b. Building Trust Between Actors

The National Land Agency (BPN), Notaries/PPATs, and the Surabaya City Government have established standard procedures for data transparency that are openly accessible to the public. NGOs and Academics: Play an active role as independent facilitators by providing legal literacy, outreach, and monitoring the mediation process. The community needs to be involved from the early stages (e.g., through public hearing or public consultation forum) to foster a sense of ownership of the results of the agreement.

c. Balancing the Distribution of Power

The city government has created regulations to prevent developer dominance in the mediation process, for example, by requiring mandatory CSR for compensation or relocation. Communities are encouraged to seek legal assistance from NGOs or academics to gain a more balanced negotiating position. Developers are required to develop compensation and relocation mechanisms in a participatory, transparent, and fair manner to avoid new disputes.

d. Strengthening Commitment in the Mediation Process

Permanent Mediation Forum: The city government forms task force for land conflict resolution as an official and sustainable institution. Mediation results must be outlined in a legally binding agreement registered with the National Land Agency (BPN). Monitoring & Evaluation: Establish a regular evaluation mechanism (e.g., every 6 months) involving the community, NGOs, and academics to ensure the agreement's implementation.

e. Utilizing Collective Action Capacity

The Surabaya City Government plays an active role as a facilitator, regulatory provider, and liaison between the interests of the community, developers, and the National Land Agency (BPN). The BPN ensures legal certainty by validating land ownership data and accelerating the legalization of old documents. Notaries/PPAT provide legal literacy services through direct outreach to the community regarding ownership rights, mediation processes, and legal protection. The community is encouraged to strengthen community

organizations so that they have a collective platform to express aspirations and fight for rights. NGOs and academics function as balance maintainers by providing technical assistance, strengthening the community's bargaining position, and ensuring procedural justice.

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