The dearth of judicial independence in Zambia’s new constitutional dispensation

Abstract

The Judiciary is considered the vanguard of human rights protection through the enforcement of individual liberties enshrined in the Constitution. Since time immemorial, the legitimacy of decisions by the courts has been anchored, to a very large extent, on the impartiality and independence of the court. Judicial independence entails that the Judge has not, in his decision in a matter, been influenced by either his will or interest in the case’s outcome or by other persons, entities or authorities other than the law. This implies that the decision made by a Judge should be based on predetermined normative standards embedded in the law. Since the attainment of political independence, the Judiciary in Zambia has undergone scrutiny with most scholars concluding that it was bereft of independence. Although the majority of these conclusions were based on the provisions of the Constitution of 1991 (as amended in 1996), the amendments to the Constitution (in 2016) have done little to guarantee judicial independence. It is argued in this article that the provisions on judicial independence under the Constitution (amendment Act 2 of 2016) Act are not only a façade but have also been crafted in a disguised manner to extend executive powers.